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INTRODUCTION 
Based on fundamental values of freedom and equality, human 
rights represent a constitutive element of any democratic society. In 
their original conception, human rights are granted to every 
individual as—to use Ronald Dworkin’s metaphor—trumps over 
state interests.1 They are designed to protect the individual from 
unwarranted interferences in crucial aspects of her life. Only in 
specific circumstances, when strict requirements of necessity and 
proportionality are met, can a state limit human rights to protect, for 
instance, public order or national security.2 Different concerns 
manifest when parties to a horizontal conflict3 invoke a human right 
to protect their interests. In such situations, where two human rights 
conflict with one another, the principle of the indivisibility of human 
 
 1. See Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 152, 153-
67 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984) (arguing that rights have priority over 
considerations of utility). 
 2. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, 
art. 29(2), U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“[E]veryone shall be subject 
only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing 
due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting 
the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a 
democratic society.”); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 9, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter 
European Convention on Human Rights].  
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; . . . (2) 
Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others. 
Id. 
 3. In this context, a horizontal conflict—one between individuals—is 
distinguished from a vertical conflict—one between an individual and the State. 
While the latter pits a human right against a State interest, the former involves the 
opposition of two human rights. 
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rights requires that both rights carry equal weight.4 Neither right can 
be used as a trump over the other and alternative means must be 
employed to resolve the conflict.  
When a conflict between human rights reaches a court, the matter 
necessarily involves a claim that the plaintiff’s rights have been 
violated. The defendant’s human rights will normally come before 
the court in an indirect manner—as part of her defense. The court 
will consequently be tempted to address the issue from the 
perspective of the directly invoked right. This is particularly true at 
the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”), since the counter-
party to a claim at the Court is always the government of the 
contracting State in question. This is also the case when the original 
conflict in domestic proceedings was one between two individuals. 
At the international level, a formerly horizontal conflict will have 
transformed, as it were, to a vertical one between the applicant and 
the State. The other individual—the domestic defendant whose 
human rights are also at stake—disappears to the background. The 
resulting approach, in which the Court addresses only the right 
invoked by the applicant and disregards to a lesser or greater extent 
the other right(s) involved, will be referred to as “preferential 
framing.” Preferential framing is problematic since it can lead to an 
unsatisfactory resolution of the conflict whereby an overemphasis on 
the right invoked causes the Court to decide the conflict in favor of 
that right to the detriment of the other neglected right. This disparity 
points us toward two basic requirements for building a constructive 
approach to conflicts between human rights, namely the correct 
identification of the conflict by the Court, followed by its resolution 
through transparent and coherent reasoning that avoids considering 
one party’s rights to the exclusion of the other’s.  
From this angle, this work will examine the conflict between 
 
 4. See World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 
1993) (“All human rights are universal, indivisible, and interdependent and 
interrelated.”); Eva Brems, Conflicting Human Rights: An Exploration in the 
Context of the Right to a Fair Trial int eh European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 294, 303 (2005) 
(noting that some scholars have attempted to hierarchically list core rights, but that 
no consensus exists on the subject, and therefore “it seems impossible to determine 
priority rules for conflicting human rights in the abstract”). 
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freedom of expression and the right to reputation. Building on 
previous research,5 it will analyze the legal reasoning of the ECtHR 
with regard to the conflict between those human rights. While 
previous research on conflicts between human rights has been largely 
limited to narrow selections of case law,6 this paper will take a more 
systematic approach—presenting a comprehensive study of one 
particular conflict through extensive, if not exhaustive, analysis of 
ECtHR case law.7  
Although other authors have discerned certain lines of reasoning 
employed by the ECtHR with regard to conflicts between human 
rights, the Court has yet to develop a general doctrine for the 
resolution of such conflicts.8 The research conducted for this paper 
 
 5. See, e.g., CONFLICTS BETWEEN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (Eva Brems ed., 
2008) (including a collection of papers presented by human rights scholars at the 
International Conference on Conflicts Between Fundamental Rights in Belgium in 
2006); Eric Barendt, Balancing Freedom of Expression and Privacy: The 
Jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court, 1 J. MEDIA L. 49 (2009) (analyzing the 
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights that balanced privacy rights and 
the rights to life and reputation with the freedom of expression); Dan Kozlowski, 
“For the Protection of the Reputation or Rights of Others:” The European Court 
of Human Rights’ Interpretation of the Defamation Exception in Article 10(2), 11 
COMM. L. & POL’Y 133, 133 (2006) (evaluating the European Court of Human 
Rights’ defamation jurisprudence which has “developed a hierarchy of protected 
expression that leaves other expression vulnerable to restriction”); Gavin Millar, 
Whither the Spirit of Lingens?, 3 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 277 (2009) (charting the 
shift in the Strasbourg jurisprudence from stringently protecting free speech to 
permitting more restrictions on speech, especially in privacy cases). See generally 
Janneke H. Gerards, Conflicterende rechten, in EUROPEES VERDRAG VOOR DE 
RECHTEN VAN DE MENS, RECHTSPRAAK & COMMENTAAR [EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, JURISPRUDENCE & COMMENTARY] 1 (Janneke 
H. Gerards et al. eds., 2009).  
 6. A notable exception, offering an excellent in-depth analysis of the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on conflicts between 
fundamental rights, as well as proposing an alternative approach to such conflicts, 
is Peggy Ducoulombier, Les Conflits de Droits Fondamentaux devant la Cour 
Européenne des Droits de l’Homme [Fundamental Rights Conflicts Before the 
European Court of Human Rights] 351-69 (Nov. 13, 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Université Strasbourg) (on file with the American University 
International Law Review) 
 7. A total of 125 judgments and admissibility decisions of the European Court 
of Human Rights have been analyzed for the purpose of this paper. This analysis of 
the Court’s jurisprudence is up to date until January 2010. 
 8. See Gerards, supra note 5, at 1 (concluding that while the Court introduced 
a tentative theoretical approach to conflicts between human rights in Chassagnou 
v. France, App. Nos. 25088/94, 28331/95, & 28443/95 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 29, 
2010] HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONFLICT 187 
revealed that in cases involving a conflict between freedom of 
expression and the right to reputation, the Court’s legal reasoning 
suffers from a lack of clarity, consistency, and transparency. To 
address these issues, the paper will first present a theoretical model 
that could be an invaluable tool for the development of transparent 
and coherent reasoning in these cases. This article applies this model 
to the Court’s defamation case law, and offers concrete insights into 
how the model might assist in improving the Court’s legal reasoning. 
However, because the scope of the research is limited to the specific 
conflict between freedom of expression and the right to reputation, 
any conclusions drawn as to the practicability of the model will be 
limited to that specific conflict. Whether or not the model can also be 
used for the resolution of other conflicts between human rights will 
need to be examined in further research. 
I. A MODEL FOR THE RESOLUTION OF 
CONFLICTS BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS 
The model presented in this paper is the result of previous research 
and is in the process of being developed.9 The model was originally 
launched by Eva Brems,10 but has already been slightly adapted for 
the purposes of this paper. The research conducted in preparation for 
this and other works support the further examination of the model’s 
practicality, with an eye toward either improving it or developing an 
alternative model. The current paper thus also serves as a testing 
ground for the model. 
 
1999) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search 
.asp?skin=hudoc-en, it has not applied this theory in its subsequent case law); 
Ducoulombier, supra note 6 (noting the peculiar nature of conflicts between rights 
and the Court’s complex and varied approaches to their resolution). 
 9. For its latest application, see Eva Brems et al., Les droits fondamentaux 
conflictuels [Conflicting Fundamental Rights], in LES DROITS CONSTITUTIONNELS 
EN BELGIQUE—LES ENSEIGNEMENTS JURISPRUDENTIELS DE LA COUR 
CONSTITUTIONNELLE, DU CONSEIL D’ETAT ET DE LA COUR DE CASSATION 
[CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN BELGIUM—THE JURISPRUDENTIAL TEACHINGS OF 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, THE COUNCIL OF STATE, AND THE COURT OF 
CASSATION] (Marc Verdussen & Nicolas Bonbled eds., forthcoming Spring 2011). 
 10. See Eva Brems, Introduction to CONFLICTS BETWEEN FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 1, 4-6 (referencing lines of reasoning that may be useful 
for developing a “polyvalent” model for legislators and judges dealing with 
conflicting human rights: eliminating fake conflicts, preferring compromise, and 
developing criteria and modalities for prioritizing rights). 
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Under the proposed model for the resolution of conflicts between 
human rights, three possibilities can be distinguished. First, the 
conflict before the Court might not be genuine one, but a so-called 
“fake conflict.” This is the case where the prima facie conflict is 
merely the result of the manner in which it is presented, and an 
alternative approach to the conflict would allow for a solution that 
leaves both human rights completely intact. A classic example of a 
fake conflict—as presented by Brems—is the situation in which 
procedural limits are imposed on the accused during a criminal trial, 
but not on the prosecutor, in order to guarantee the delivery of a 
judgment within a reasonable time.11 In this situation, an apparent 
conflict arises between the right to equality of arms and the right to a 
trial within a reasonable time, which are both elements of the right to 
a fair trial as recognized in Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.12 However, in Wynen v. Belgium, the ECtHR defused 
the conflict by holding that the reasonable time objective should be 
realized without impinging on the equality of arms.13 Hence, both 
human rights were left intact and the situation was defused as a fake 
conflict. Naturally, wherever possible, this is the preferred solution to 
“conflicts” between human rights. 
In most situations, however, the Court will be confronted with a 
genuine conflict rendering the above solution impossible. In such 
cases, a course of action that upholds both human rights to the extent 
possible should be preferred over a situation in which one right is 
sacrificed for the sake of the other. In this context, several authors 
have identified the possible value of the doctrine of Praktische 
Konkordanz, developed by the German Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) for the resolution of conflicts between 
human rights.14 This doctrine involves a judicial search for a 
 
 11. Id. at 4. 
 12. Compare European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2, art. 6(1) 
(“everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time”), with 
id. art. 6(3)(b) (“[e]veryone charged with a criminal offense has [the right to] 
adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence”). 
 13. See 2002-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 217, 231-32 (holding that, while the Court is 
sensitive to the need to ensure that proceedings are not prolonged unnecessarily, 
the principle of equality of arms does not prevent the achievement of such an 
objective, provided that one party is not placed at a clear disadvantage). 
 14. See Brems, supra note 10, at 4 (singling out the German Constitutional 
Court for its development of a general approach to solving conflicts of rights rather 
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compromise in which both human rights give way to each other and 
a solution is reached that keeps both rights intact to the greatest 
extent possible.15  
Yet, in the majority of cases, a compromise solution will not be 
achievable and the Court will need to undertake the difficult exercise 
of determining which right deserves preference over the other. In that 
respect the model offers guidance by presenting several criteria 
under which the human rights in question can be “weighed” against 
each other, taking all the circumstances of the specific case into 
account.  
The first criterion is the impact, or the seriousness, of the 
infringement. This “impact criterion” could be used to determine the 
extent to which both rights would be impaired by allowing the 
opposing right to take preference. The logic behind this criterion is 
the following: Presume a conflict arises between two individuals. 
Individual A invokes right X and claims his right should prevail, 
while individual B does the same, invoking right Y. If the exercise of 
right X by A would lead to a serious impairment of right Y of B, 
while the exercise of right Y by B would have only minor 
consequences for right X of A, protection of right Y could be more 
advisable.  
A second criterion is that of the core/periphery. In applying the 
“core/periphery criterion,” the Court could determine whether the 
aspects of the rights that enter into conflict belong to the core or the 
periphery of the human right in question. Using the above example, 
the rationale is that where a conflict arises between a core aspect of 
right X and a periphery aspect of right Y, right X would16 deserve 
 
than the more common ad hoc approach taken by many other courts and 
legislatures). 
 15. See Olivier De Schutter & Françoise Tulkens, Rights in Conflict: The 
European Court of Human Rights as a Pragmatic Institution, in CONFLICTS 
BETWEEN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 203 (clarifying that “Praktische 
Konkordanz,” or “practical concordance,” achieves a compromise between 
conflicting rights by “optimizing” each right against the other). 
 16. Unlike under the third and fourth criterion, the stronger assertion “would” 
is used instead of the weaker “could” to indicate that the core of a human right 
should receive strong protection over peripheral aspects of other rights. Allowing 
infringement of the core of a right in order to protect the peripheral aspect of 
another right would rob the former right of its very essence, which should arguably 
receive (near) absolute protection. See, e.g., B. v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 
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more protection.  
A third criterion is the involvement of additional rights. When the 
conflict is not limited to two human rights, but also involves other 
rights, the “additional rights criterion” could be used to assess the 
strength of both parties’ positions, taking into account the additional 
rights involved. Suppose the conflict between A and B is not limited 
to rights X and Y. Suppose that the exercise of right X by A would 
not only affect right Y of B, but would also negatively impact right 
Z, also belonging to B. In that case, B’s legal position could be 
strengthened by the involvement of right Z.17 
A fourth criterion is the close involvement of a general interest, 
which could strengthen the position of one of the human rights in the 
conflict. The “general interest criterion” could work as follows: If the 
exercise by A of right X would not only impair right Y of B, but 
would also have negative effects for a general interest, while the 
same would not hold true for the exercise of right Y by B, then 
protection of right Y could prove to be more prudent.18  
A fifth criterion is the “purpose criterion.” This criterion can be 
used when a right is exercised in a manner contrary to the very aim it 
is designed to achieve. In those circumstances, that right is to be 
accorded lesser weight. In our example this would be the case if the 
exercise of right X by A is specifically linked to the exercise of right 
Y by B in that they both serve the same purpose of protecting an 
interest of B. This criterion can for instance be applied in the context 
of a conflict between the right to education of a child and the right of 
parents to freely choose the education of their children. When the 
 
36536/02, ¶ 34 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 13, 2005) (HUDOC Database), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (holding that 
limitations on the right to marry “must not restrict or reduce the right in such a way 
or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired”); A. v. The 
United Kingdom, App. No. 35373/97, ¶ 74 (Eur. Ct. H.R Dec. 17, 2002) (holding 
that limitations on the right of access to court cannot “restrict or reduce the access 
left to the individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the 
right is impaired”). 
 17. Whether or not such a conclusion is justified will depend on the particular 
circumstances of the case. It is well possible that protection of right X of A will 
remain more important than protection of rights Y and Z of B. 
 18. A remark similar to the one mentioned in footnote 17 is made here. The 
involvement of a general interest can by itself not determine the outcome of the 
case. It is well possible that right X would also prevail over the general interest. 
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exercise of the parental rights would undermine the child’s right to 
education, the application of the purpose criterion would lead to 
Court protection of the child’s right because the parental rights are 
closely linked to—and a condition for—the fulfillment of the child’s 
right.19 
A sixth and final useful element of the model is the “responsibility 
criterion.” This criterion, based on a criterion suggested by Olivier 
De Schutter,20 implies that a person choosing to exercise her right 
bears the responsibility for the manner in which she chooses to 
exercise it. This criterion does not call for a direct comparison 
between rights, but instead offers flexibility to determine whether 
one right has been exercised responsibly. In that sense, the criterion 
plays an important role in the conflict between freedom of expression 
and the right to reputation, in light of the “duties and responsibilities” 
referred to in Article 10(2) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (“ECHR”).21 Where the freedom of expression is exercised 
irresponsibly, preference might be given to the right to reputation. 
The presented model, naturally, should not be seen as static. It 
does not offer absolute solutions to abstract conflicts. Rather, it is 
flexible in that its application will be entirely dependent on the 
 
 19. It is not yet entirely clear whether the purpose criterion could play a 
separate role in this example because the parents/child rights conflict also 
implicates the core/periphery criterion. However, this paper suggests that 
according it a separate place might be justified. 
 20.  For Olivier De Schutter’s comments in the round table discussion 
“Recente Ontwikkelingen in de Rechstpraak van het Europees Hof voor de 
Rechten van de Mens” [Recent developments in the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights], held on May 22, 2002 in Ghent, Belgium, see Eva 
Brems, Recente Ontwikkelingen in de Rechstpraak van het Europees Hof voor de 
Rechten van de Mens [Recent Developments in the Jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights], in EN TOCH BEWEEGT HET RECHT [AND YET THE LAW 
MOVES] 237, 244 (Willem Debeuckelaere and Dirk Voorhoof eds., 2003). 
 21. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2, art. 10.  
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression . . . . The exercise of these freedoms, 
since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, 
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public 
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of 
the judiciary. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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circumstances of the case, to which certain criteria might not be 
relevant or fail to offer a clear solution. For example, consider a 
situation where both A’s and B’s position could be strengthened by 
general interests of equal importance: α for B and β for A. The 
model’s flexibility ensures that judges applying it will retain their 
freedom to decide the particular case without being constrained by a 
rigid, checklist-like analysis. Additionally, adhering to the logic 
underlying the model will allow for the delivery of more consistent 
and transparent jurisprudence. 
II. THE LEGAL REASONING OF THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS  
While Article 10 of the ECHR guarantees the right to freedom of 
expression, its second paragraph expressly refers to “the protection 
of the reputation or the rights of others” as one of the legitimate 
grounds for restricting that right.22 However, in its first leading 
defamation case, Lingens v. Austria, the ECtHR categorically denied 
the existence of a conflict between freedom of expression and right 
to reputation, stating that there was no need to read Article 10 in light 
of Article 8—the right to respect for private life—of the ECHR.23 
The reason for this finding was simple: based on a literal reading of 
Article 10(2), the Court did not recognize the existence of a separate 
right to reputation, instead treating it as a mere private interest to be 
protected.24 However, following Lingens, the ECtHR slowly began to 
recognize the existence of a genuine conflict between freedom of 
expression and the right to reputation in defamation cases. The 
Court’s evolution in this direction became apparent in the Article 10 
cases of Feldek v. Slovakia,25 Lesnik v. Slovakia,26 and Radio France 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. See 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 14, 25 (1986) (clarifying that the adjective 
“necessary” in Article 10(2) implies that the freedom of expression can be 
infringed only in exceptional circumstances, and that public condemnations of 
political figures do not fall within the exception). 
 24. See id. (noting that the defamatory statements, which concerned comments 
made about certain public figures, did not trigger any conflicts with privacy rights). 
 25. See 2001-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 91, 110 (acknowledging that the prioritization 
of a public figure’s personality rights is not “necessary in a democratic society” as 
provided under Article 10(2), and therefore is not a sufficient and relevant 
justification for interfering with the applicant’s Article 10 rights). 
 26. See 2003-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 169, 179 (ruling that it was necessary and 
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v. France, the latter being the first case in which the Court expressly 
stated that “the right to protection of one’s reputation is . . . one of 
the rights guaranteed by [Article 8], as one element of the right to 
respect for private life.”27  
This jurisprudential evolution culminated with Chauvy v. France, 
an Article 10 case in which the Court for the first time identified the 
existence of a conflict between two ECHR rights in defamation 
cases.28 Chauvy represented a classic example of a defamation case. 
The applicants had published a book on the arrest of the French 
Resistance’s leader, Jean Moulin, by the Nazis during World War 
II.29 The book raised the possibility that Mr. and Mrs. Aubrac, former 
members of the Resistance, had “betrayed Jean Moulin and had 
thereby been responsible for his arrest, suffering and death.”30 Mr. 
and Mrs. Aubrac instituted libel proceedings against the author and 
publisher of the book.31 The domestic courts found them guilty of 
defamation and sentenced them to a fine.32 They were also ordered to 
publish a warning in each book, indicating the conviction, and to pay 
damages to Mr. and Mrs. Aubrac.33 The applicants consequently 
complained of a violation of their freedom of expression at the 
ECtHR.34 In assessing their application, the Court balanced the 
public’s interest in being informed and the need to protect the 
reputation of Mr. and Mrs. Aubrac.35  
[T]he Court must verify whether the authorities struck a fair balance when 
 
sufficient under Article 10(2) to interfere with the applicant’s Article 10(1) right to 
freedom of expression because the applicant’s statements of fact, which contained 
accusations of unlawful and abusive conduct, were unsubstantiated by evidence 
and were capable of insulting the public prosecutor and affecting him in the 
performance of his duties). 
 27. 2004-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 125, 148. 
 28. See 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 211, 229-30 (recognizing that a duty of the 
Court is to verify the proper balance of conflicting rights, such as Article 10’s 
guarantee of freedom of expression and Article 8’s guarantee of protection of 
reputation and private life). 
 29. Id. at 212. 
 30. Id. at 229. 
 31. Id. at 213. 
 32. Id. at 218 (stating that the French court fined the author 100,000 Francs and 
the chair of the publishing company 60,000 Francs). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 218, 220. 
 35. Id. at 229. 
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protecting two values guaranteed by the Convention which may come into 
conflict with each other in this type of case, namely, on the one hand, 
freedom of expression protected by Article 10 and, on the other, the right 
of the persons . . . to protect their reputation, a right which is protected by 
Article 8 of the Convention as part of the right to respect for private life.36 
In resolving the conflict, the ECtHR underlined the importance of 
both rights involved. While the Court emphasized the crucial role of 
the press in a democratic society, it attached more weight to the 
domestic courts’ findings that the author had made particularly grave 
insinuations for which he could not rely on the defence of good faith, 
since he “had failed to respect the fundamental rules of historical 
method in the book.”37 The Court consequently found that the 
domestic court’s ruling struck a fair balance between both rights 
involved because it had not construed the “principle of freedom of 
expression too restrictively or the aim of protecting the reputation of 
others too extensively.”38 Having further established that the 
sanctions imposed on the applicants in the domestic proceedings 
were not unreasonable and not unduly restrictive of their freedom of 
expression, the Court found that there had been no violation of 
Article 10.39  
This case and others like it, by confirming that the right to 
reputation is protected under Article 8, paved the way for defamation 
plaintiffs, who had failed to obtain satisfaction in domestic 
proceedings, to claim a violation of Article 8 at the ECtHR.40 In 
addition to dozens of cases in which the conflict between freedom of 
expression and the right to protection of reputation is examined 
 
 36. Id. at 229-30. 
 37. Id. at 231 (agreeing with the French court’s decision to convict the 
applicant and to reject his plea of good faith because he had made grave 
insinuations and had failed to exercise appropriate and sufficient caution, which in 
this case would have required a critical analysis of sources). 
 38. Id. (determining that the infringement on the applicants’ right to freedom of 
expression was not impermissibly severe, given the facts that the book remained in 
publication and that the fines imposed were “relatively modest”). 
 39. Id. at 232 (finding that the state’s interference with the right was 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued). 
 40. Cf. Stijn Smet, Of Rights and Interests, STRASBOURG OBSERVERS, April 28, 
2010, http://strasbourgobservers.com/2010/04/28/of-rights-and-interests/ (noting 
that the the ECtHR generally recognizes a conflict between the right to freedom of 
expression and the right to reputation, even if the Court does not specifically 
identify or resolve the conflict). 
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under Article 10, this jurisprudential development gave rise to 
several Article 8 cases addressing the conflict, including the leading 
case of Pfeifer v. Austria.41 
A closer examination of all Court judgments and relevant 
admissibility decisions in defamation cases since Chauvy shows that 
the Court has explicitly identified the conflict between freedom of 
expression and the right to reputation in twenty-four of the ninety 
relevant cases.42 However, there are also two Article 8 cases that are 
 
 41. App. No. 12556/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 15, 2007) (HUDOC Database), 
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en. For a 
discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying notes 215-18. 
 42. In the following cases, the Court identified a tension between Article 8’s 
guarantee of protection of right to private life and reputation, and Article 10’s 
guarantee of freedom of expression, categorizing the tension as a conflict between 
rights, competing interests or values, or in need of a fair balance between Article 8 
and Article 10 rights. Those citations with the reference “(HUDOC Database)” can 
be found online at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en. 
See, e.g., Europapress Holding D.O.O. v. Croatia, App. No. 25333/06, ¶ 58 (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. Oct. 22, 2009) (HUDOC Database); Romanenko v. Russia, App. No. 
11751/03, ¶ 42 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 8, 2009) (HUDOC Database); Bodrožić v. 
Serbia, App. No. 32550/05, ¶ 55 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 23, 2009) (HUDOC 
Database); Standard Verlags GmbH v. Austria (no. 2), App. No. 21277/05, ¶¶ 46, 
52 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 4, 2009) (HUDOC Database); A. v. Norway, App. No. 
28070/06, ¶¶ 65, 66 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 9, 2009) (HUDOC Database); Times 
Newspapers Ltd. v. The United Kingdom (nos. 1 and 2), App. Nos. 3002/03 & 
23676/03, ¶¶ 45-46 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 10, 2009) (HUDOC Database); 
Mahmudov v. Azerbaijan, App. No. 35877/04, ¶ 49 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 18, 2008) 
(HUDOC Database); Petrina v. Romania, App. No. 78060/01, ¶ 36 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Oct. 14, 2008) (HUDOC Database); Pfeifer v. Austria, App. No. 12556/03, ¶¶ 38, 
49 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 15, 2007) (HUDOC Database); Leempoel v. Belgium, App. 
No. 64772/01, ¶¶ 67, 78 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 9, 2006) (HUDOC Database); White 
v. Sweden, App. No. 42435/02, ¶¶ 21, 26 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 19, 2006) (HUDOC 
Database); Malisiewicz-Gasior v. Poland, App. No. 43797/98, ¶ 60 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Apr. 6, 2006) (HUDOC Database); Minelli v. Switzerland (dec.), App. No. 
14991/02, ¶ 2 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 14, 2005) (HUDOC Database); Pedersen v. 
Denmark, App. No. 49017/99, ¶ 91 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 17, 2004) (HUDOC 
Database); Cumpănă v. Romania [GC], 2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 69, 89; Karhuvaara 
v. Finland, 2004-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 263, 274; Abeberry v. France (dec.), App. No. 
58729/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 21, 2004) (HUDOC Database); Chauvy v. France, 
2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 211, 229. Compare Kuliś v. Poland, App. No. 15601/01, ¶ 
54 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 18, 2008) (HUDOC Database) (acknowledging that the 
domestic courts failed to strike a balance between the competing interests), and 
Kwiecień v. Poland, App. No. 51744/99, ¶ 52 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 9, 2007) 
(HUDOC Database) (indicating that the domestic courts failed to recognize a 
conflict between the right to freedom of expression and the protection of 
reputation), with Ivanova v. Bulgaria, App. No. 36207/03, ¶ 67 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 
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difficult to square with the findings in the Chauvy case.43 Most 
interesting in this respect are the Court’s considerations in Karakó v. 
Hungary.44 This case involved a flyer distributed during an election 
campaign in which the applicant, a politician standing in the 
elections, was accused of having exercised his parliamentary 
functions to the detriment of his country of origin.45 In assessing the 
application, the Court denied the existence of a conflict between 
freedom of expression and the right to reputation.  
The Court is satisfied that the purported conflict between Articles 8 and 
10 of the Convention, as argued by the applicant, in matters of protection 
of reputation, is one of appearance only. To hold otherwise would result 
in a situation where . . . the outcome of the Court’s scrutiny would be 
determined by whichever of the supposedly competing provisions was 
invoked by an applicant.46  
In order to support this argument, the Court reassessed the 
question of whether the notion of private life should be extended to 
include reputation and concluded that the Court’s prior case law had 
only recognized the existence of such a right sporadically, and 
mostly in cases involving serious allegations which had an inevitable 
direct effect on the applicant’s private life.47  
 
14, 2008) (HUDOC Database) (noting that the domestic courts fully recognized the 
conflict). See generally Flux v. Moldova (no. 6), App. No. 22824/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
July 29, 2008) (HUDOC Database); Riolo v. Italy, App. No. 42211/07 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. July 17, 2008) (HUDOC Database); Alithia Publ’g Co. v. Cyprus, App. No. 
17550/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 22, 2008) (HUDOC Database). 
 43. See Karakó v. Hungary, App. No. 39311/05, ¶¶ 22-24 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 
28, 2009) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/ 
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (finding that, because the applicant did not show that 
the publication affected his reputation or caused serious interference with his 
private life, there had not been an Article 8 violation); Gunnarsson v. Iceland 
(dec.), App. No. 4591/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 20, 2005) (HUDOC Database), 
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (declining 
to find any Article 8 violation where a newspaper published unsubstantiated 
allegations insinuating that a bank director had made potentially unethical business 
decisions based on personal motives). 
 44. App. No. 39311/05. 
 45. Id. ¶ 7 (recounting the offensive portions of the flyer, which declared that 
the applicant voted against the interests of his county and inflicted the gravest of 
harm on his own electoral district). 
 46. Id. ¶ 17. 
 47. See id. ¶¶ 22-23 (distinguishing between the concept of personal integrity, 
as inalieable and protected under human rights law, and reputation, as an external 
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This judgment ignores an abundance of case law explicitly 
recognizing an individual’s reputation as an element of her private 
life protected under Article 8.48 However, Karakó does have the 
important value of highlighting the problem of preferential framing 
in the context of the conflict between freedom of expression and the 
right to reputation. Several authors—one of whom is the President of 
the Chamber that delivered the judgment in Karakó—have warned 
about this problem, claiming that the Court’s ruling is influenced by 
the right invoked by the applicant.49 An examination of the results in 
the seventy-nine judgments since Chauvy, both under Article 8 and 
Article 10, shows that there is some strength to this argument, 
although it is too soon to draw a definitive conclusion on this issue 
because of the relatively few number of Article 8 cases.50 The issue 
of preferential framing will be addressed in more detail later in this 
paper. However, assuming for now that a problem of preferential 
framing indeed exists in the context of the conflict between freedom 
of expression and the right to reputation, this does not excuse the 
reasoning used in the Karakó case. What the Court suggests in 
Karakó is that the conflict does not exist because its solution would 
be predetermined.51 Rather than avoiding the conflict, the Court’s 
 
social evaluation protected under defamation law). 
 48. See infra notes 57, 202 and accompanying text. For a detailed analysis of 
the role of the right to reputation in the case law of the ECtHR, see Dean 
Spielmann & Leto Cariolou, The Right to Protection of Reputation Under The 
European Convention on Human Rights, in TEISE BESIKEICIANCIOJE EUROPOJE: 
LIBER AMICORUM PRANAS KURIS [LAW IN A CHANGING EUROPE: LIBER AMICORUM 
PRANAS KURIS] 401-424 (Saulius Katuoka ed., 2008). 
 49. See, e.g., De Schutter & Tulkens, supra note 15, at 190 (identifying the 
Court’s tendency to view the rule that the applicant invoked as the only right at 
stake and to view the government’s measure interfering with that right as an 
exception or limitation, rather than as involving protection of a separate, 
conflicting right). 
 50. This author’s examination yields the following results. Of the seventy-four 
Article 10 cases, fifty-nine led to the finding of a violation by the Court and fifteen 
led to the finding of no violation, while of the five Article 8 cases, three led to the 
finding of a violation and two to the finding of no violation. Detailed figures 
(violation: no violation) according to the status of the plaintiff in the defamation 
proceedings are as follows—Article 10: politician: 31-4; public official: 12-5; 
public figure: 7-2; private individual: 7-3; company: 2-1—Article 8: politician: 1-
1; public figure: 0-1; private individual: 2-0. 
 51. See App. No. 39311/05 at ¶ 17 (concluding that any supposed conflict must 
exist in appearance only because the outcome of any actual conflict would be 
determined predominantly by which right the applicant invoked). 
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aim should be to address the supposed problem of preferential 
framing. The model presented in Part II could be extremely helpful 
in this respect, most notably because the suggested criteria force the 
Court to look at the conflict from the perspective of both rights.52 
This is required by the core/periphery criterion, the impact criterion, 
the additional rights criterion, and the general interest criterion.53 The 
purpose and the responsibility criteria likewise counterbalance the 
preferential framing issue by introducing boundaries for the manner 
in which human rights can be exercised when they enter into conflict 
with other human rights.54  
The following sub-sections present an analysis of the case law of 
the ECtHR on the conflict between freedom of expression and the 
right to reputation. The intention of this analysis is not to determine a 
substantive solution to the conflict, nor to indicate which right should 
prevail. Instead, the aim is to identify interesting lines of legal 
reasoning used by the Court and to assess the Court’s consistency 
and transparency under both Article 10 and Article 8, in light of the 
model presented above.  
A. THE LEGAL REASONING OF THE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 10 OF 
THR ECHR 
In theory, there should be many interesting opportunities to 
compare pre- and post-Chauvy case law, given that the nature of the 
conflict between freedom of expression and right to reputation has 
shifted from one between a Convention right and a private interest 
(at best, protected at the international level and/or as a fundamental 
right in domestic constitutions)55 to one between two Convention 
rights with a priori equal value. When the Court is confronted by a 
 
 52. See supra notes 9–21 and accompanying text. 
 53. See supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text. 
 54. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text. 
 55. The right to reputation is protected by the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, art. 17, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter 
ICCPR] (“No one shall be subjected to . . . unlawful attacks on his honour and 
reputation . . . [and] [e]veryone has the right to the protection of the law against 
such . . . attacks.”). Furthermore, several national Constitutions protect a right to 
reputation or honor. See, e.g., KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ 
[CONSTITUTION], Apr. 2, 1997, art. 47 (Pol.) (“Everyone shall have the right to 
legal protection of his private and family life, of his honour and good reputation 
and to make decisions about his personal life.”). 
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situation in which a Convention right is opposed by a private interest 
not protected by the Convention, the situation is relatively 
straightforward. Whatever the decision in the concrete case might be, 
the Convention right receives greater weight in the abstract 
relationship with the private interest. The Court will thus apply the 
classic proportionality test to determine whether the interference with 
the applicant’s freedom of expression is proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued. However, matters change when two 
Convention rights conflict. Neither right has preference over the 
other, at least not in abstract terms.56 In such circumstances one 
would expect to see changes in the Court’s reasoning. Due to the 
presence of two Convention rights, the Court can reasonably be 
expected to take both human rights into account on an equal footing. 
This position is justified by the fact that, if the conflict cannot be 
defused as a fake conflict and if no practical concordance can be 
found, the decision of the Court will have inescapable negative 
consequences for a right protected under the Convention. Particular 
attention to the identification of the conflict and full transparency and 
consistency in the Court’s reasoning are thus crucial.  
It is, therefore, all the more striking that the Court has failed to 
consistently identify the conflict between freedom of expression and 
the right to reputation in post-Chauvy defamation cases. While the 
Court has taken an explicit stance on the conflict in its Article 8 
cases, as of the date of this publication it has only explicitly 
identified the conflict in nineteen of eighty-three relevant Article 10 
cases since Chauvy.57 A partial explanation for the lack of 
 
 56. Compare European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2, art. 2 
(“Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law.”), with id. art. 3 (“No one shall 
be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”). 
Other than by stating which rights are derogable and which are not, the ECHR 
does not indicate the relative importance of its rights provisions. 
 57. In the following cases, the Court directly addressed the tension between the 
right to freedom of expression and the right to protection of one’s reputation. 
Those citations with the reference “(HUDOC Database)” can be found online at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en. See, e.g., Europapress 
Holding D.O.O. v. Croatia, App. No. 25333/06, ¶ 58 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 22, 2009) 
(HUDOC Database); Romanenko v. Russia, App. No. 11751/03, ¶ 42 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. Oct. 8, 2009) (HUDOC Database); Bodrožić v. Serbia, App. No. 32550/05, ¶ 
45 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 23, 2009) (HUDOC Database); Standard Verlags GmbH v. 
Austria (no. 2), App. No. 21277/05, ¶¶ 46, 52 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 4, 2009) 
(HUDOC Database); Mahmudov v. Azerbaijan, App. No. 35877/04, ¶ 49 (Eur. Ct. 
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identification might be found in the fact that the Court has refrained 
from developing a distinctive test to tackle the conflict. On the 
contrary, even after recognizing the existence of a conflict between 
two human rights in the Chauvy case, the Court has continued to 
apply the proportionality test, as developed under its Article 10 case 
law prior to Chauvy, in an identical manner in subsequent cases.58 As 
a result, it is often unclear to what extent the Court has taken the 
presence of two Convention rights into account when ruling on the 
particular case before it.  
The conclusion that the Court has only minimally changed its legal 
reasoning after Chauvy is not only contrary to expectations but also 
reveals a worrisome problem of principle. If conflicts between the 
freedom of expression and the right to reputation are resolved in a 
 
H.R. Dec. 18, 2008) (HUDOC Database); Flux v. Moldova (no. 6), App. No. 
22824/04, ¶ 25 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 29, 2008) (HUDOC Database); Riolo v. Italy, 
App. No. 42211/07, ¶ 62 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 17, 2008) (HUDOC Database); 
Alithia Publ’g Co. v. Cyprus, App. No. 17550/03, ¶ 63 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 22, 
2008) (HUDOC Database); Kuliś v. Poland, App. No. 15601/01, ¶ 54 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. Mar. 18, 2008) (HUDOC Database); Times Newspapers Ltd. v. The United 
Kingdom (nos. 1 and 2), App. Nos. 3002/03 & 23676/03, ¶¶ 45-46 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Mar. 10, 2009) (HUDOC Database); Ivanova v. Bulgaria, App. No. 36207/03, ¶ 67 
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 14, 2008) (HUDOC Database); Kwiecień v. Poland, App. No. 
51744/99, ¶ 52 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 9, 2007) (HUDOC Database); Leempoel v. 
Belgium, App. No. 64772/01, ¶¶ 67, 78 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 9, 2006) (HUDOC 
Database); Malisiewicz-Gąsior v. Poland, App. No. 43797/98, ¶ 60 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Apr. 6, 2006) (HUDOC Database); Pedersen v. Denmark, App. No. 49017/99, ¶ 91 
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 17, 2004) (HUDOC Database); Cumpănă v. Romania [GC], 
2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 69, 89; Karhuvaara v. Finland, 2004-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 263, 
274; Abeberry v. France (dec.), App. No. 58729/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 21, 2004) 
(HUDOC Database). 
 58. In doing so, the Court assesses the proportionality of the interference by 
looking at a wide variety of factors, including the status of the applicant; the status 
of the plaintiff in the defamation proceedings; the existence of a public interest; the 
content, tone and form of the statement; the distinction between statements of fact 
and value judgments; the duties and responsibilities referred to in Article 10(2); 
and the nature and severity of the penalty. See, e.g., Porubova, App. No. 8237/03 
at ¶¶ 49-50 (emphasizing the nature and severity of the penalty in its holding); 
Öztürk v. Turkey, App. No. 17095/03, ¶ 32 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 9, 2009) (HUDOC 
Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-
en (criticizing the domestic court for not considering the applicant’s contribution to 
a matter of public interest); Chauvy v. France, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 211, 230 
(focusing on the content, tone, and form of the statement); Lingens v. Austria, 103 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 14, 26 (1986) (holding that because politicians open 
themselves to public scrutiny, they must exhibit a greater tolerance for criticism). 
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near identical manner to situations where the freedom of expression 
conflicts with a mere private interest—the reputation of the plaintiff, 
this offers a strong indication that in the view of the Court there 
exists little difference between a Convention right to reputation and a 
private interest in one’s reputation, not protected by the Convention. 
This reasoning is problematic because it either raises the level of 
importance of a mere private interest to that of a Convention right or 
demotes the importance of a Convention right to that of a mere 
interest.59 In both cases, the principled higher value of human rights 
protected by the ECHR, serving as a trump over interests, is 
damaged.60 This observation provides further justification for the use 
of a different reasoning which is specifically tailored to resolve the 
conflict between freedom of expression and the right to reputation. 
Such a reasoning can fit naturally into the classic proportionality test, 
but the presented elements argue against applying the test in the 
same way it was applied prior to Chauvy. 
The following subsections offer an analysis of the Court’s 
defamation case law under the criteria of the model developed above 
to assess if, how, and to what extent the Court applies these criteria 
in the post-Chauvy era. More crucially, these subsections consider 
the post-Chauvy case law in order to determine how the Court could 
 
 59. However, it must be noted that, looking beyond the confines of the ECHR, 
the right to reputation is protected by Article 17 of the ICCPR, supra note 55, and 
that national Constitutions, like that of Poland, may also protect a right to 
reputation or honor. E.g., KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ 
[CONSTITUTION], Apr. 2, 1997, art. 47 (Pol.). Referring to reputation as a mere 
private interest prior to Chauvy may thus hide the fact that it actually received 
protection at the international and/or national level. However, the fact remains that 
reputation was not recognized as a human right under the ECHR prior to Chauvy 
and Pfeifer.  
 60. Cf. supra note 56. The conclusion drawn is thus contingent on the 
acceptance that, for the purposes of application of the ECHR, Convention rights 
should also receive a priori greater weight than interests protected by a 
fundamental right at the national or international level, but not recognized as a 
Convention right. Support for this argument may be found in Chassagnou v. 
France, App. Nos. 25088/94, 28331/95, & 28443/95, ¶ 113 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 29, 
1999) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search 
asp?skin=hudoc-en (“Where restrictions are imposed on a right guaranteed by the 
Convention in order to protect ‘rights and freedoms’ not . . . enunciated therein[,] . 
. . only indisputable imperatives can justify interference with enjoyment of a 
Convention right.”). 
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improve the consistency and transparency of its legal reasoning. 
Finally, where pertinent, the minimal changes in the Court’s case law 
will be indicated. 
 1. The Impact Criterion 
The ECtHR has relied on arguments that are closely linked to the 
impact criterion—or the extent to which both rights would be 
impaired by allowing the opposing right to take preference—in 
several aspects of its post-Chauvy defamation case law. 
 a. Nature and Severity of the Penalty 
In many defamation cases, the Court has attached particular 
weight to the role of the press as a “public watchdog” and its 
contribution to ensuring the proper functioning of a democracy.61 In 
this respect the Court has implicitly considered the impact criterion 
by referring to the “chilling effect” that would result from restrictions 
on the exercise of freedom of expression by members of the press or 
applicants with similar functions.62 Cumpănă v. Romania provides a 
good example of the application of this argument.63 In this case, 
journalists were criminally convicted for publishing newspaper 
articles alleging that a civil servant had behaved unlawfully in 
awarding private contracts for the towing of illegally parked 
vehicles.64 The journalists were sentenced to prison for seven months 
and prohibited from working as journalists for one year. In assessing 
 
 61. See, e.g., Porubova, App. No. 8237/03 at ¶ 42 (reiterating the importance 
of the press in a political democracy); Lingens, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 26 (“Freedom 
of the press . . . [and more generally of political debate] . . . is at the very core of 
the concept of a democratic society.”). 
 62. See Selistö v. Finland, App. No. 56767/00, ¶ 53 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 16, 
2004) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search 
.asp?skin=hudoc-en (requiring careful scrutiny of State measures that are “capable 
of discouraging the press from disseminating information on matters of legitimate 
public concern”); Cumpănă, 2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 95 (expressing that the 
“chilling effect” of sanctions on journalistic freedom is a factor in determining the 
proportionality of such sanctions); Nikula v. Finland, 2002-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 297, 
312 (noting the “potential ‘chilling effect’” of even minor criminal penalties on 
freedom of expression). 
 63. See 2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 95 (declaring that the fear of imprisonment 
has a chilling effect on the freedom of expression and “works to the detriment of 
society as a whole”). 
 64. Id. at 73, 75-76. 
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the application, the Court established that although states parties are 
permitted, or even required by their positive obligations under 
Article 8, to regulate freedom of expression to ensure adequate 
protection of an individual’s reputation, they must not do so in a 
manner that has a “chilling effect” on the media.65 The Court found a 
violation of Article 10 in the instant case because it considered the 
measures taken to protect the reputation of the plaintiff to be 
“manifestly disproportionate,” since the imposition of prison 
sentences and/or a prohibition on exercising their profession may 
inhibit journalists from reporting on matters of general interest.66  
The Court’s reasoning in Cumpănă offers great potential. It used 
the impact criterion to determine that, even if the right to reputation 
takes precedence over the freedom of expression in certain cases, the 
resulting penalty for the exercise of the freedom of expression should 
not be an excessive reaction.67 In other words, the Court used the 
impact criterion to determine that a Praktische Konkordanz should 
be found at the level of the penalty. 
Unfortunately, Cumpănă appears to be a rather exceptional case. 
The only other case in which the Court relied on this line of 
reasoning is Mahmudov v. Azerbaijan.68 An analysis of the entire 
case law gives the impression that the Court has applied the factor of 
the nature and severity of the penalty in an ambiguous manner. The 
Court sometimes found even a minor sanction to be disproportionate 
when no relevant or sufficient reasons were presented for the 
restriction,69 while in cases where those reasons were asserted, it held 
 
 65. See id. at 90, 94-95 (warning that authorities must not undermine or deter 
the media from playing their “vital role of ‘public watchdog’” in a democratic 
society—alerting the public to the suspected misuse of government power). 
 66. Id. at 96. 
 67. See id. at 94, 96 (asserting that the nature and severity of the punishment 
are factors that the Court considers when determining whether the state action is a 
necessary restriction on the applicant’s rights, and holding that the penalty in the 
case before it was excessive). 
 68. See App. No. 35877/04, ¶¶ 37, 49 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 18, 2008) (HUDOC 
Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-
en (quoting extensively from Cumpănă regarding the role of media as a watchdog, 
the factors to consider for proportionality, and the chilling effect that State 
measures can have on freedom of the press). 
 69. See, e.g., Standard Verlags GmbH v. Austria, App. No. 19710/02, ¶ 59 
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 2, 2006) (HUDOC Databse), available at http://cmiskp.echr. 
coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (noting that even the “modest fine 
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much more severe sanctions to not be excessive.70 This ambiguity 
could be interpreted in two ways—either as an indication that the 
Court is struggling with the conflict between freedom of expression 
and the right to reputation, not knowing where to fit the nature and 
severity of the penalty into the equation, or as a result of a lack of 
transparency in its reasoning. Without having the benefit of insight 
into the Judges’ minds, it is impossible to know with certainty which 
interpretation is correct.71 Whatever the case may be, the Court’s 
reasoning would benefit from increased and explicit attention to the 
 
suspended on probation” was disproportionate because the applicant should not 
have been convicted at all); Brasilier v. France, App. No. 71343/01, ¶ 43 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. Apr. 11, 2006) (HUDOC Databse), available at http://cmiskp.echr 
.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (ruling that the sanction of paying 
symbolic damages of one French Franc was excessive, and therefore constituted a 
violation of Article 10). 
 70. The following cases involved a criminal conviction of the applicant, with 
imposition of a fine and an order to pay damages, where the Court held that the 
very imposition of a criminal penalty does not itself violate Article 10. See Ivanova 
v. Bulgaria, App. No. 36207/03, ¶ 68 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 14, 2008) (HUDOC 
Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-
en (“In view of the margin of appreciation left to Contracting States by that 
provision, a criminal measure as a response to defamation cannot, as such, be 
considered disproportionate to the aim pursued.”); Lindon v. France [GC], App. 
Nos. 21279/02 & 36448/02, ¶ 59 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 22, 2007) (HUDOC Databse), 
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en 
(concluding that the fine was appropriate, as were the civil damages, because they 
were both moderate); Ivanciuc v. Romania (dec.), 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 251, 259 
(concluding that the penalty was proportionate, despite the fact that the applicant’s 
criminal conviction was “very serious,” because the fine and civil damages were 
modest and the applicant showed a manifest lack of interest during the criminal 
proceeding). 
 71. Much of the confusion is arguably also caused by the fact that the Court 
rules on the proportionality of the sanction in cases where it has already 
established that there are no relevant and sufficient reasons for the restriction of 
freedom of expression. In the vast majority of those cases, the Court appears to be 
determined to find the sanctions applied to be disproportionate, no matter what 
their nature or severity might be. Naturally, this leads to apparent contradiction in 
other cases, where the Court is of the opinion that the right to reputation should 
take precedence, thus leading it to find that more severe sanctions are not 
disproportionate and thus not violative of the Convention. Compare Standard 
Verlags GmbH, App. No. 19719/02 at ¶ 59 (holding that the fine was 
disproportionate because the conviction was not justified, given the domestic 
court’s failure to make a factual finding as to the truth of the statement), with 
Ivanciuc, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 258 (acknowledging that the fine was 
proportionate because the assertions had not been made in good faith and lacked a 
factual basis). 
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rationales developed in Cumpănă and Mahmudov.72  
 b. Status of the Plaintiff 
Ever since Lingens v. Austria, the ECtHR has distinguished 
between several categories of plaintiffs in defamation proceedings 
and established the limits of acceptable criticism against them.73 
Politicians are required to demonstrate a greater degree of tolerance 
to criticism than ordinary citizens, since a politician “inevitably and 
knowingly lays himself open to close scrutiny of his every word and 
deed.”74 The level of acceptable criticism is also more expansive for 
public servants than private individuals.75 However, because they do 
not knowingly and willingly lay themselves open to close scrutiny to 
the same extent as politicians do, and because they “must enjoy 
public confidence . . . free of undue perturbation if they are to be 
successful in performing their tasks,” the range of acceptable 
criticism against public servants will be less broad than it is for 
politicians.76 With regard to public figures, the Court has consistently 
held that when private individuals enter the public arena they lay 
themselves open to public scrutiny and should therefore display a 
greater degree of tolerance to criticism.77 Finally, the Court reasons 
 
 72. Naturally, this line of reasoning will be most useful in a case where the 
Court finds that relevant and sufficient reasons exist to award precedence to the 
right to reputation over the freedom of expression, which would set aside the 
matter of the proportionality of the sanction in determining whether Article 10 has 
been violated. 
 73. See Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 14, 25-26 (1986) 
(describing the level of acceptable criticism for politicians as higher than that for a 
private individual). 
 74. See id. at 26 (acknowledging that politicians too have a right to the 
protection of their reputation, but that the protections must be balanced with the 
interests of open debate in a democratic society). 
 75. E.g., Nikula v. Finland, 2002-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 297, 310-11. 
 76. See Lesnik v. Slovakia, 2003-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 169, 178. 
 77. See Bodrožić v. Serbia, App. No. 32550/05, ¶ 54 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 23, 
2009) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/ 
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (noting that the plaintiff had become a public figure 
after writing a book on a matter of public interest and appearing on television, and 
was therefore “obliged to display a greater degree of tolerance”); Karman v. 
Russia, App. No. 29372/02, ¶ 35 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 14, 2006) (HUDOC Databse), 
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (noting 
that since the plaintiff organized and spoke at a public gathering he should be 
aware of the risk of criticism); Jerusalem v. Austria, 2001-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 75, 83 
(finding that since the plaintiffs had participated in public debate, they should have 
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that private individuals should be awarded the largest protection 
from defamatory statements in Article 10 cases because they have 
not specifically opened themselves up to public scrutiny.78  
By creating a division between different categories of plaintiffs 
and requiring that certain persons should exhibit a greater degree of 
tolerance to criticism than others, the Court creates an excellent 
opportunity for the application of the impact criterion. Theoretically 
speaking and extrapolating from the Court’s prior reasoning in this 
respect, this application could take the following form. Categories of 
persons who willingly and knowingly lay themselves open to public 
scrutiny will expect the possibility of criticism. Therefore, the impact 
of defamatory statements on their reputation is arguably less 
profound and more easily mitigated. The limits of acceptable 
criticism are thus wider with regard to these persons. Conversely, the 
impact of defamatory statements on the reputation of persons who do 
not lay themselves open to public scrutiny will be greater. Therefore, 
the level of acceptable criticism with regard to these persons is more 
limited and their reputation arguably deserves additional protection.  
Keeping the above in mind, it is striking that the recognition of the 
existence of a conflict between freedom of expression and the right 
to reputation has had virtually no effect on the way the Court 
addresses the status of the plaintiff in post-Chauvy cases. Even more 
problematic is the Court’s one-sided application of the impact 
criterion.79 In cases involving defamation of politicians, for instance, 
the foundation of the Court’s reasoning always lies in the finding that 
the limits of acceptable criticism are wider with regard to 
politicians.80 However, in the examined Article 10 cases regarding 
defamation of a private individual, the Court rarely initiates its 
analysis from the converse assumption that the level of acceptable 
 
a higher degree of tolerance for criticism); Nilsen v. Norway [GC], 1999-VIII Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 63, 88-89 (asserting that it was not the individual’s capacity as a public 
servant that opened him to public scrutiny, but instead his choice to contribute and 
participate in the public debate). 
 78. E.g., Tammer v. Estonia, 2001-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 267, 280. 
 79. See De Schutter & Tulkens, supra note 15, at 190 (noting that the Court 
frames the issue as principally involving the right invoked by the applicant, and 
only evaluates the impact on a conflicting right if the opposing party raises it as a 
defense). 
 80. See, e.g., Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 14, 26 (1986).  
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criticism is more limited with regard to private individuals.81 The 
Court thus succumbs to preferential framing. Rather than looking to 
factors that both have an impact on the strength of the applicant’s 
argument for freedom of expression and help determine the 
importance of the plaintiff’s right to reputation, the Court focuses its 
attention on the freedom of expression alone. In order to truly 
address the conflict, the status of the plaintiff should be used not only 
to determine the limits of acceptable criticism, but also to assess the 
importance of the right to reputation. Arguably, the latter should 
even be the Court’s primary function when considering the status of 
the plaintiff. It makes sense to assess the importance of the right to 
reputation on the basis of the status of the plaintiff, just as it is 
logical to determine the breadth of the freedom of expression of the 
applicant on the basis of her status.  
 c. Content, Tone, and Form of the Statement 
An important element to consider when assessing the content of 
the statement is the use of insulting or offensive terms.82 The Court 
has exhibited great tolerance for such terms, especially prior to 
Chauvy, pointing to the extensive protections provided even to 
insulting speech under Article 10. The Court has ruled that the use of 
terms such as “racist agitation,” “idiot,” “Nazi,” “Neo-Nazi,” and 
“fascist” does not automatically justify restriction of the freedom of 
expression.83 Accordingly, the Court has almost always found a 
violation of Article 10, particularly when the terms are used in the 
 
 81. But see Tammer, 2001-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 280-81 (describing the limits of 
acceptable criticism for private individuals as narrow, but nonetheless comparing 
those limits to those of a politician or government without ever determining if the 
plaintiff, a former politician, was a public or private figure). 
 82. Cf. Chauvy v. France, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 211, 231 (reaching the 
conclusion that the conviction of the defendants was well-reasoned and deserved in 
part because they made “grave insinuations” in their book). 
 83. See, e.g., Scharsach v. Austria, 2003-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 127, 137 (holding 
that the term “Nazi” did not ipso facto support a conviction just because of the 
special stigma attached to it); Unabhängige Initiative Informationsvielfalt v. 
Austria, 2002-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 275, 283 (finding that accusing a politician of “racist 
agitation” was not a gratuitous personal attack in part because it contributed to a 
political discussion about subjects of general interest to the public); Oberschlick v. 
Austria (no. 2), 1997-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1268, 1274-75 (concluding that the use of 
the term “Trottel” (“idiot”) did not constitute a gratuitous personal attack because 
the author provided an objective explanation for the word’s use). 
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context of a public debate as a reaction to indignation knowingly 
aroused by others—usually extreme right-wing politicians.84  
Oberschlick v. Austria (no. 2), for instance, concerned a 
newspaper publication in which extreme right-wing politician Jörg 
Haider was referred to as an “idiot” in reaction to a speech in which 
he glorified the role of all soldiers, including those in the German 
army, who had taken part in World War II.85 The applicant 
subsequently published a newspaper article containing the following 
sentence: “I will say of Jörg Haider, firstly, that he is not a Nazi and, 
secondly, that he is, however, an idiot.”86 The applicant was 
consequently convicted and ordered to pay a fine for having used the 
insulting term to describe Mr. Haider.87 The domestic courts also 
ordered the seizure of the newspaper issue, which was later retracted, 
and required the newspaper to publish news of the conviction.88 In 
finding an Article 10 violation, the ECtHR relied heavily on the fact 
that the term “idiot” was used in the context of a political discussion 
provoked by Mr. Haider’s speech.89 The Court deemed that the term 
may have been offensive, but not excessively so, in light of the 
indignation Mr. Haider knowingly aroused.90 
Cases in which the terms “Nazi,” “Neo-Nazi,” and “fascist” are 
used often also involve a charge of criminal behavior, because many 
 
 84. See, e.g., Scharsach, 2003-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 138 (holding that Article 
10(2) provides little support for restrictions on debate over questions of public 
interest); Unabhängige Initiative, 2002-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 283 (noting that a charge 
of “racist agitation” directed toward a politician did not necessitate government 
intervention); Oberschlick (no. 2), 1997-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1274-75 (describing 
Article 10 as protective of both the substance of the ideas conveyed and the form 
of conveyance). But see Constantinescu v. Romania, 2000-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 31, 
43 (finding that the applicant’s use of the term “‘delapidatori’, which refers to 
persons found guilty of fraudulent conversion, was offensive because the subjects 
had not been convicted by a court, and thus there were “relevant and sufficient” 
reasons for government interference with the applicant’s speech). 
 85. Oberschlick (no. 2), 1997-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1270. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 1271 (specifying twenty day-fines of 200 Austrian schillings, each 
carrying ten days imprisonment upon default). 
 88. Id. at 1270-71. 
 89. See id. at 1276 (reasoning further that the insult was an opinion, or value 
judgment, “whose truth is not susceptible of proof”). 
 90. See id. (characterizing the insult as “polemical,” but not as a gratuitous 
attack given the author’s “objectively understandable explanation” that he was 
merely responding to Mr. Haider’s incendiary speech). 
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European countries treat propagating and defending National-
Socialist ideas as a criminal offense.91 However, in its case law prior 
to Chauvy, the Court has stated on many occasions that this element 
alone does not justify a conviction for defamation since “the degree 
of precision for establishing the well-foundedness of a criminal 
charge by a competent court can hardly be compared to that which 
ought to be observed by a journalist when expressing his opinion on 
a matter of public concern.”92 In only one case prior to Chauvy did 
the Court find that the use of an insulting term related to Nazism 
justified a domestic finding of defamation. However, this case—
Wabl v. Austria—did not involve use of the term by a member of the 
press to describe a politician or public official, unlike the other 
above-referenced cases where the Court found a violation of Article 
10.93 Instead, it concerned the opposite situation—a politician reacted 
to a newspaper article about him by referring to it as “Nazi-
journalism.”94 
In its case law after Chauvy, the Court appears to be less forgiving 
of the use of insulting terms. Although in several cases it has 
continued to rule that the use of terms such as “Nazi,” “insane,” or 
“neofascist” does not automatically justify a restriction for the 
reasons set out above,95 it has on other occasions found that the use 
 
 91. See, e.g., STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [CRIMINAL CODE], Nov. 13, 1998, 
REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] I, §§ 86, 130 (Ger.), available at 
http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StGB.htm (prohibiting the incitement of 
hatred against segments of the population, the distribution or display of materials 
which incite such hatred, and the public approval of the Nazi party’s acts or denial 
of the heinousness of those acts). 
 92. E.g., Unabhängige Initiative Informationsvielfalt v. Austria, 2002-I Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 275, 284; Scharsach v. Austria, 2003-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 127, 137. 
 93. App. No. 24773/94, ¶¶ 22-23 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 21, 2000) (HUDOC 
Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-
en (explaining the Austrian Supreme Court’s decision that the politician’s 
indignation about defamatory reporting did not justify his retort—characterized as 
a value judgment attacking the journalist’s reputation, not as political speech 
intending to shock or provoke).  
 94. Id. ¶ 42 (finding both the original article and the politician’s response to be 
defamatory, but upholding the order enjoining the politician’s public use of the 
offensive phrase). 
 95. See, e.g., Brunet-Lecomte v. France, App. No. 13327/04, ¶ 35 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. Nov. 20, 2008) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe 
.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (asserting that the word “énergumène” 
(“fanatic”) is polemical, but does not exceed normal press provocation); Karman v. 
Russia, App. No. 29372/02, ¶ 39 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 14, 2006) (HUDOC Databse), 
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of terms such as “executioner” or “chief of a gang of killers” exceeds 
the allowed limits of exaggeration and provocation.96 These cases are 
some of the few instances where the Court has assessed the impact of 
the statement on the reputation of the plaintiff. In Lindon v. France, 
the Court also pointed out that the use of certain terms or statements 
is not necessary for the exercise of one’s freedom of expression in 
bringing across an idea or opinion.97 Lindon involved a series of 
criminal convictions related to the publication of a book entitled 
“Jean-Marie Le Pen on Trial.”98 The book was a fictional work with 
real life elements about the murder of a North African man by a 
Front National (“FN”) militant.99 The FN is an extreme right-wing 
political party led by Mr. Le Pen, and the book raised questions as to 
Mr. Le Pen’s ultimate responsibility for the militant’s violent 
 
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en 
(reiterating that the stigma attached to the words “Nazi” or “neo-fascist” does not 
support a conviction for defamation on its own); Wirtschafts-Trend Zeitschriften-
Verlags GmbH v. Austria, App. No. 58547/00, ¶ 38 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 27, 2005) 
(HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp? 
skin=hudoc-en (determining that use of the term “punishment camps” did not 
belittle the heinousness of Nazi concentration camps). 
 96. See Lindon v. France [GC], App. Nos. 21279/02 & 36448/02, ¶¶ 57, 66 
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 22, 2007) (HUDOC Databse), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (agreeing with the 
state court’s determination that the terms “chief of a gang of killers” and 
“vampire” were unacceptable because they were not just value judgments but 
allegations of fact); Ivanciuc v. Romania (dec.), 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 251, 258 
(affirming a state court ruling that use of the term “executioner” was defamatory 
when made in reference to a person who had been tried and acquitted of homicide 
while driving under the influence of alcohol); see also Aguilera Jiménez v. Spain, 
App. Nos. 28389/06, 28955/06, 28957/06, 28959/06, 28961/06, & 28964/06 (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. Dec. 8, 2009) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr 
.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (holding that the domestic court was 
within its margin of appreciation to sanction various rude statements). 
 97. App. No. 21279/02 at ¶ 66; cf. Backes v. Luxembourg, App. No. 24261/05, 
¶ 49 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 8, 2008) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp 
.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (holding that the applicant could 
have contributed to an open discussion on a matter of public interest without 
recourse to accusations that the plaintiff was suspected of involvement in 
organized crime). Another example, but pre-Chauvy, can be found in 
Constantinescu v. Romania, 2000-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 43 (concluding that the 
defendant could have expressed his opinion and criticism in the context of a public 
debate without using an offensive term). 
 98. App. No. 21279/02 at ¶¶ 10-12. 
 99. Id. 
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actions.100 The book referred to Mr. Le Pen as the “chief of a gang of 
killers” and a “vampire who thrives on the bitterness of his 
electorate, but sometimes also on their blood.”101 These excerpts 
were reproduced in a newspaper article, which was written in 
reaction to the conviction of the authors of the book;102 the 
newspaper was subsequently charged and convicted for this 
reproduction.103 The ECtHR considered the content of the statements, 
among other factors, in reaching the conclusion that the conviction 
had not violated Article 10.104 The Court established that, because the 
defamatory remarks had a potential impact on the public and because 
their reproduction was not necessary to give a full account of the 
prior conviction, the applicant had overstepped the limits of 
permissible provocation by reproducing them.105 Without taking a 
stance on the results of the Court’s reasoning in the instant case, the 
above clearly constitutes a good example of the Court having fully 
applied the impact criterion. Unfortunately, it is also one of the few 
to be found in the Court’s post-Chauvy case law. 
The Court also considers the tone of the statement in question—
consistently awarding additional protection to freedom of expression 
when the defamatory statement is uttered in an ironic or satirical 
manner. Since ironic and satirical statements—like parodies—by 
their very nature involve exaggeration and provocation, the Court 
views them more leniently.106 The Court does not draw an explicit 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. ¶ 57. 
 102. Id. ¶ 21. 
 103. Id. ¶ 22. 
 104. Id. ¶ 66. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See, e.g., Da Silva v. Portugal, App. No. 41665/07, ¶ 29 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 
20, 2009) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197 
/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (commenting that satirical commentary plays an 
important role in free debate on questions of general interest); Öztürk v. Turkey, 
App. No. 17095/03, ¶ 26 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 9, 2009) (HUDOC Database), 
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en 
(referencing the author’s use of irony in his criticism of the plaintiff, and holding 
that his article conveyed ideas that contributed to the public debate); Vereinigung 
Bildener Künstler v. Austria, App. No. 68354/01, ¶ 33 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 25, 
2007) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search 
.asp?skin=hudoc-en (noting that the painting was satirical and intended to distort 
reality and provoke, and therefore interference with such expression must be 
“examined with particular care”); Wirtschafts-Trend Zeitschriften-Verlags GmbH 
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link between the tone of the statement and the impact on the 
reputation of the plaintiff, but this is nonetheless a classic example of 
where the impact criterion could be applied to strengthen the Court’s 
reasoning. Prohibiting an ironic or satirical statement would deprive 
the applicant of his freedom of expression, while allowing it would 
arguably have a minor impact on the reputation of the plaintiff, given 
the clearly humorous tone of the statement.107 
As to the form of the statement, the Court has occasionally taken 
into account the fact that the potential damage to the reputation of the 
plaintiff will be more limited when the statement is not disseminated 
to the public or when it is published through a medium with a rather 
limited audience, such as a specialized book, instead of through the 
general print media.108 For example, in Raichinov v. Bulgaria, the 
Court had to consider the conviction of a public servant for stating 
that the deputy Prosecutor-General “is not a clean person” during a 
 
v. Austria (no. 3), App. Nos. 66298/01 & 15653/02, ¶ 39 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 13, 
2005) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/ 
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (recalling that a fundamental function of the press is to 
impart information on matters of public interest and that, to this end, journalists are 
permitted a degree of exaggeration). 
 107. See Nikowitz v. Austria, App. No. 5266/03, ¶ 25 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 22, 
2007) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search 
.asp?skin=hudoc-en (making reference to the ironic and satirical style of the article 
by which the humorous nature of the statement was evident). 
 108. See, e.g., Frankowicz v. Poland, App. No. 53025/99, ¶ 48 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Dec. 16, 2008) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/ 
tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (noting that the statements were made in an 
opinion that the patient requested and that was not subsequently published or made 
known to a wider audience); Azevedo v. Portugal, App. No. 20620/04, ¶ 32 (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. Mar. 27, 2008) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr 
.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (finding a violation of Article 10 where 
the allegedly defamatory publication was distributed only to members of the 
scientific community); Lindon, App. No. 21279/02 at ¶ 47 (HUDOC Database) 
(explaining that the statement was published in a novel with a generally narrow 
readership, and thus it caused less damage to the complainant’s reputation than if 
the statement were published in a medium that appealed to a larger group of 
people); Zakharov v. Russia, App. No. 14881/03, ¶ 22 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 5, 2006) 
(HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp? 
skin=hudoc-en (considering allegedly defamatory statements made in a private 
letter); Raichinov v. Bulgaria, App. No. 47579/99, ¶ 48 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 20, 
2006) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search 
.asp?skin=hudoc-en (involving a statement made to members of a meeting behind 
closed doors). 
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meeting of the Supreme Judicial Council.109 The Court relied on the 
fact that the statement had been made in front of a limited audience, 
behind closed doors, and without the presence of the press or any 
other publicity.110 In holding that the negative impact on the 
reputation of the plaintiff was accordingly limited, the Court found 
that the criminal conviction of the applicant violated Article 10.111 
The Court has also consistently been more lenient on applicants 
uttering a defamatory statement in the context of an oral exchange or 
a heated debate, since in these cases the applicant does not have the 
benefit of forethought and careful consideration otherwise present in 
written statements.112 The Court has also applied the impact criterion 
in these situations to determine that the effect on the reputation of the 
plaintiff must have been minimal when the oral exchange takes place 
outside of the presence of the media.113  
In Gavrilovici v. Moldova, a case involving the conviction of a 
private individual who was sentenced to five days of detention for 
having supposedly called the president of the regional council a 
fascist, the Court took into account the particular circumstances in 
which the insulting remark had allegedly been uttered.114 The 
applicant was accused of making the statement during a heated 
exchange immediately after he was told that the regional council 
would stop providing financial aid for the medical transportation of 
 
 109. App. No. 47579/99 at ¶ 10. 
 110. See id. ¶ 48 (contrasting this case with another case where two municipal 
guards were insulted in the street in front of numerous bystanders). 
 111. Id. ¶¶ 48, 53. 
 112. See, e.g., Gavrilovici v. Moldova, App. No. 25464/05, ¶ 58 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Dec. 15, 2009) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/ 
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (concluding that intervention was unnecessary because 
the statement was made in response to provocation and in a state of anger); Csanics 
v. Hungary, App. No. 12188/06, ¶ 44 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 20, 2009) (HUDOC 
Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-
en (recognizing that statements made in a public debate are often made during a 
heated dispute, which warrants a high level of protection under Article 10); 
Raichinov, App. No. 47579/99 at ¶ 51 (holding that a criminal conviction in 
response to an oral statement is a disproportionate response). 
 113. Gavrilovici, App. No. 25464/05 at ¶ 59 (noting that the statements during a 
council meeting held in camera with no media coverage had minimal effect on the 
plaintiff’s reputation, especially because those present were aware of the 
preexisting tension between the applicant and the complainant). 
 114. Id. ¶ 54. 
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his chronically ill wife and son.115 The Court consequently 
established that, even if the disputed remark had indeed been uttered 
by the applicant, he was clearly in a state of despair and anger—
circumstances where the effect on the reputation of the plaintiff must 
have been minimal because all those present at the council meeting 
were aware of the tension and had heard the unspecified provoking 
statements made by the plaintiff.116 The Court therefore ruled that the 
criminal conviction and detention of the applicant violated Article 
10.117  
Although the above considerations regarding the form of the 
statement appear to indicate that the Court pays careful attention to 
the impact criterion, it is worth noting that in its post-Chauvy case 
law, the Court only uses this argument in cases where the damage to 
the reputation is expected to be limited. It hardly ever uses it in the 
opposite sense—to find a greater potential damage to reputation 
when statements are made through mass or print media.118 
 d. Statements of Fact versus Value Judgments 
A crucial element in many defamation cases is the question of 
proof of the impugned statements. In this respect, the Court 
distinguishes two categories of statements. Statements of fact, in 
principle, require proof of veracity by the applicant,119 while value 
 
 115. Id. ¶ 9. 
 116. Id. ¶¶ 58-59. 
 117. See id. ¶ 60-61 (“The Court recalls that imposing criminal sanctions on 
someone who exercises the right to freedom of expression can be considered 
compatible with Article 10 ‘. . . only in exceptional circumstances, notably where 
other fundamental rights have been seriously impaired . . . .’”). 
 118. Compare Pedersen v. Denmark, App. No. 49017/99, ¶ 79 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Dec. 17, 2004) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/ 
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (acknowledging the relevance of the fact that the 
statement was made on national television, which has a wider audience than print 
media), with Karhuvaara v. Finland, 2004-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 263, 275 (finding that 
even though the statements were made on national television, the resulting greater 
potential for harm did not justify a conviction for defamation). 
 119. However, in certain cases, including very recent ones, the Court merely 
requires a factual basis for statements of fact instead of full proof. See, e.g., 
Ieremeiov v. Romania (no. 2), App. No. 4637/02, ¶ 43 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 24, 
2009) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/ 
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (concluding that because the applicant had received 
information from two known witnesses, there was a factual basis for his 
defamatory remarks, and that this factual basis precluded a finding of bad faith 
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judgments or statements of opinion are not capable of being 
proven.120 Requiring the delivery of proof of a value judgment 
consequently infringes the freedom of opinion itself.121 Nonetheless, 
value judgments should be founded on a sufficient factual basis.122 
The distinction between statements of fact and value judgments is 
relevant for procedural and evidentiary reasons.123 Further, some 
elements connected to the standards of proof have a direct bearing on 
the conflict between freedom of expression and the right to 
reputation.  
At the most straightforward level, the complete absence of proof 
for a statement of fact or of any factual basis for a value judgment 
has often led the Court to find in favor of the right to reputation of 
the plaintiff.124 In this context, the Court has ruled that the more 
 
regardless of whether the remarks were properly characterized as value judgments 
or statements of fact); Flux v. Moldova (no. 7), App. No. 25367/05, ¶ 40 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. Nov. 24, 2009) (HUDOC Database), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (protecting the 
media’s reporting of public opinion where statements are not devoid of 
foundation); Romanenko v. Russia, App. No. 11751/03, ¶ 47 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 8, 
2009) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search 
.asp?skin=hudoc-en (requiring only a sufficient and reliable factual basis, not proof 
of veracity, scaled in proportion to the nature of allegation); Pedersen, App. No. 
49017/99 at ¶ 76 (insisting on a showing of sufficient factual basis for the factual 
accusation made against a named chief superintendent). 
 120. E.g., Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 14, 28 (1986). 
 121. See id. (stating that it would be impossible to verify a value judgment, as it 
is an opinion, and therefore fundamentally protected by Article 10). 
 122. See Oberschlick v. Austria (no. 1), 204 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 4, 27 (1991) 
(noting that the applicant published a true statement of facts before making an 
unsubstantiated “value-judgment as to those facts”). 
 123. See NORMAN J. SINGER & JD SHAMBIE SINGER, 2B SUTHERLAND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 56A:4(I)(a) (7th ed. 2010) (theorizing that only 
statements about the empirical world are meaningful and distinct from value 
statements, which are opinions that do not represent the world as it is). 
 124. See, e.g., Pedersen, App. No. 49017/99 at ¶¶ 84-85, 87 (holding that a taxi 
driver’s oral statement to the applicant did not provide a sufficient factual basis for 
the subsequent accusation that the chief superintendant had suppressed the driver’s 
police report because there was no evidence whatsoever that the driver had actually 
filed a report). See generally Falter Zeitschriften GmbH v. Austria (dec.), App. No. 
13540/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 8, 2007) (HUDOC Database), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (exemplifying the 
Court’s view that a lack of facts to support an allegation is a decisive factor); 
Keller v. Hungary (dec.), App. No. 33352/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 4, 2006) 
(HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp? 
skin=hudoc-en (holding for the plaintiff because the applicant’s statement was 
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serious an allegation, the more solid the factual basis must be.125 
However, the Court has applied the standard of proof for showing 
this basis in a flexible manner—even allowing the necessity of a link 
between a value judgment and its factual basis to vary from case to 
case.126 For example, the need to provide a factual basis is less 
stringent where the facts are already known to the public.127 
Although the Court has not offered any clarification for this 
argument, it might well be based on an assumption that in such cases 
the possible impact on the reputation of the plaintiff is more 
limited.128  
Additionally, the Court considers the distinction between 
statements of facts and value judgments, and thus the accompanying 
standards of proof, to be less significant in the context of a lively 
political debate.129 In these cases, the Court has accorded a wide 
 
factual but unsubstantiated, and he did not offer proof of the statement’s truth); 
Abeberry v. France, App. No. 58728/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 21, 2004) (HUDOC 
database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en 
(recalling that the proportionality of State interference depends on the existence of 
a solid factual basis for the offending remark). 
 125. See Ivanova v. Bulgaria, App. No. 36207/03, ¶ 64 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 14, 
2008) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search 
.asp?skin=hudoc-en (determining that the applicant’s allegation required 
substantial justification because it was very serious and was printed in a popular 
and widely circulated daily newspaper). 
 126. See Feldek v. Slovakia, 2001-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 91, 109 (finding that the 
Court cannot accept as a matter of principle that a value judgment can only be 
considered if it is accompanied by the facts on which that judgment was based). 
 127. Wirtschafts-Trend Zeitschriften-Verlags GmbH v. Austria, App. No. 
58547/00, ¶ 35 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 27, 2005) (HUDOC Database), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en. 
 128. See, e.g., Verlagsgruppe News GmbH v. Austria, App. No. 76918/01, ¶ 30 
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 14, 2006) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr 
.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (noting that the allegations had already 
been widely disseminated through another newspaper and the subjects were 
political figures open to public scrutiny); Karhuvaara v. Finland, 2004-X Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 263, 274-75 (observing that the subject of the allegations had been publicized 
in popular political satire, and therefore the identity of the parties were already 
well-known prior to these allegations). 
 129. See Lombardo v. Malta, App. No. 7333/06, ¶ 60 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 24, 
2007) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search 
.asp?skin=hudoc-en (promoting the view that elected officials and journalists 
should enjoy broad discretion to criticize during lively political debates, even when 
their statements lack a solid factual basis); see also Dyuldin v. Russia, App. No. 
25968/02, ¶ 49 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 31, 2007) (HUDOC Database), available at 
2010] HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONFLICT 217 
freedom to criticize, even where statements may lack a clear basis in 
facts. This principle was applied, for instance, in Dyuldin v. Russia, a 
case involving an open letter jointly written by a trade union leader 
and a journalist in which they accused a regional government of 
misusing funds and of directing reprisals against the independent 
media through violence and censorship.130  
One final example is a case—Flux v. Moldova—where the Court 
found a violation of Article 10 despite there being unproven 
statements of fact. This case involved members of the press who had 
been civilly convicted for accusing the Communist Party of having 
accepted bribes from “big fuel importers” in the form of meals and a 
lavish party.131 While the Court conceded that it had not been proven 
whether the importers’ company actually paid for the event, it 
concluded that the lengthy passage of time between the event and the 
initiation of the defamation proceedings was a bar to the applicant’s 
ability to prove the facts.132 The Court also pointed out that any 
damage done to the plaintiff’s reputation had “substantially 
diminished with the passage of time.”133 This latter point constitutes 
a prime example of the Court applying the impact criterion to its 
fullest extent.  
 2. The Core/Periphery Criterion 
The core/periphery criterion has the potential of playing an 
important role in the Court’s case law on defamation, especially in 
light of the ongoing debate at the Court regarding the precise place 
for the protection of reputation within Article 8.134 Most Article 8 and 
 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (reiterating the 
holding in Lombardo). 
 130. See Dyuldin, No. 25968/02 at ¶¶ 9-11 (noting that the letter was a collective 
effort by journalists and human rights activists, founded on their first-hand 
experience working in the media in Russia). 
 131. Flux v. Moldova (no. 1), App. No. 28702/03, ¶ 6-7 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 20, 
2007) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search 
.asp?skin=hudoc-en. 
 132. See id. ¶¶ 31, 35 (considering the applicant’s arguments that it was difficult 
and near impossible to prove facts from a newspaper article and the damages 
inflicted one year after the events). 
 133. Id. ¶ 35. 
 134. See Adam Wagner, Libel Reform Watch, U.K. HUM. RTS. BLOG (June 7, 
2010), http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2010/06/07/libel-reform-watch/ (preserving 
a forum dedicated to libel reform in the United Kingdom, and discussing the 
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Article 10 judgments in which the Court has taken a stance simply 
reiterate that a person’s reputation is an element of her private life 
protected under Article 8. However, the Court established in Karakó 
that the right to reputation only comes into play as an independent 
right when an attack on a person’s reputation reaches a certain level 
of gravity and causes such a prejudice to the enjoyment of her right 
to private life as to undermine her personal integrity.135 While 
awaiting the future developments of the Court’s defamation case law, 
an argument regarding the status of reputation within Article 8 could 
be raised on the basis of the Court’s Article 8 cases on photographs136 
and press disclosure of a private person’s HIV-positive status.137 The 
Court explicitly states that both those matters touch the core of the 
right to respect for private life. Similar statements regarding 
reputation in general are absent in the Court’s defamation case law. It 
thus seems that reputation in principle does not belong to the core of 
Article 8.138 
 
protections of Articles 8 and 10 in the context of publications tending to defame 
notable British citizens). 
 135. See Karakó v. Hungary, App. No. 39311/05, ¶¶ 21, 23 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 
28, 2009) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197 
/search .asp?skin=hudoc-en (referencing the Von Hannover case and distinguishing 
between reputation and personal integrity, holding that "personal integrity rights 
falling within the ambit of Article 8 are unrelated to the external evaluation of the 
individual, whereas in matters of reputation, that evaluation is decisive: “one may 
lose the esteem of society—perhaps rightly so—but not one’s integrity, which 
remains inalienable"). 
 136. See, e.g., Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 47, 72-73 
(holding, in what is now considered the leading case on the subject, that publishing 
photographs violated Article 8 where those photographs made no contribution to a 
debate of general interest, the public had no legitimate interest in the applicant’s 
private life, and the applicant had a “legitimate expectation” of privacy); Sciacca v. 
Italy, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 63, 68-69 (finding that publishing a photograph of a 
teacher who was charged with serious crimes was a violation of Article 8 because a 
person has a privacy right to their image).  
 137. See, e.g., Armonienė v. Lithuania, App. No. 36919/02, ¶ 42 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Nov. 25, 2008) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/ 
tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (holding that disclosing a person’s HIV-positive 
status in a publication violates Article 8 because the illness is a purely private 
matter); Biriuk v. Lithuania, App. No. 23373/03, ¶ 41 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 25, 
2008) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search 
.asp?skin=hudoc-en (deciding that a publication describing an applicant as HIV-
positive and detailing her sexual lifestyle contravened protections in Article 8). 
 138. The cases involving photographs and disclosure of delicate and confidential 
medical information regarding private individuals raise different issues within the 
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Certain expressions, on the other hand, do belong to the core of 
Article 10. The Court attaches great importance to particular aspects 
of the freedom of expression, including press freedom and political 
speech, because of their essential importance in a democratic society. 
The Court also accords a wide freedom of expression to particular 
categories of people, such as politicians and candidates for elections, 
because they represent an electorate and defend the interests of the 
voters.139 As a result, the Court assesses restrictions on the freedom 
of expression of politicians with the closest scrutiny.140 The Court 
has also awarded extended protection to freedom of expression 
exercised by union members in the context of labor disputes because 
these debates concern the core interests of the employees.141 In the 
eyes of the Court, limiting the freedom of expression of union 
members and leaders would deprive the union of its purpose.142 The 
above lines of reasoning could be seen as an application of the 
 
right to private life than “ordinary” defamation cases do. This justifies why the 
rights involved in those cases touch the core of the right to private life, while 
reputation in general does not. 
 139. See, e.g., Lepojić v. Serbia, App. No. 13909/05, ¶ 74 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 6, 
2007) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search 
.asp?skin=hudoc-en (pointing particularly to politicians, political parties, and their 
members as deserving of wide discretion, especially during election campaigns); 
Lombardo v. Malta, App. No. 7333/06, ¶ 53 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 24, 2007) 
(HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp? 
skin=hudoc-en (explaining that elected representatives not only represent the 
electorate, but also draw attention to public interests); Brasilier v. France, App. No. 
71343/01, ¶ 42 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 11, 2006) (HUDOC Database), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (highlighting the need 
for increased tolerance of critical speech during a contested election as part of its 
finding that the domestic court had levied disproportionate penalties on the 
applicant and thereby violated Article 10). 
 140. See Jerusalem v. Austria, 2001-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 75, 82 (asserting that 
politicians have broad leeway with regard to the expression of their views). But see 
Keller v. Hungary (dec.), App. No. 33352/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 4, 2006) 
(HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp 
?skin=hudoc-en (holding that interference was necessary because the accusation, 
despite having been made by a politician, had no factual basis). 
 141. See Csanics v. Hungary, App. No. 12188/06, ¶¶ 44-45 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 
20, 2009) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/ 
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (noting that the tone of labor disputes is often heated—
yet another reason they require a high level of Article 10 protection). 
 142. Aguilera Jiménez v. Spain, App. Nos. 28389/06, 28955/06, 28957/06, 
28959/06, 28961/06, & 28964/06, ¶¶ 32-33 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 8, 2009) (HUDOC 
Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-
en. 
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core/periphery criterion, albeit in a one-sided manner, to provide 
additional protection to freedom of expression. 
 3. The Additional Rights Criterion 
The additional rights criterion is especially relevant in the 
numerous defamation cases involving allegations of criminal 
conduct. If the Court applied this paper’s model, the plaintiff’s right 
to reputation would be strengthened because it is supported by other 
rights, namely the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty 
in court, under ECHR Article 6(2).143 However, the Court has 
exhibited an ambiguous approach to the presumption of innocence, 
especially in its post-Chauvy case law. Certain cases indicate that the 
Court attaches increased importance to this element.144 This is 
evident in Alithia Publishing Company v. Cyprus, a case involving a 
civil defamation conviction for publication of newspaper articles 
alleging that a former Minister of Defense was corrupt.145 In this case 
the Court explicitly stated that the right to the presumption of 
innocence was relevant to the balancing exercise that the Court must 
undertake.146 Here, the Court ruled that there was no Article 10 
violation because the applicants had not demonstrated good faith 
when they “acted in flagrant disregard of the duties of responsible 
journalism . . . [by publishing statements that] undermined the 
 
 143. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2, art. 6(2) (“Everyone 
charged with a criminal offense shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty 
according to law.”). 
 144. See, e.g., Flux v. Moldova (no. 6), App. No. 22824/04, ¶¶ 25, 31 (HUDOC 
Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-
en (cautioning that newspapers do not have free reign to recklessly publish 
allegations of criminal acts without allowing the accused to counter the claims, 
especially where they have not been convicted by a criminal court); Alithia Publ’g 
Co. v. Cyprus, App. No. 17550/03, ¶ 63 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 22, 2008) (HUDOC 
Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-
en (indicating that the principle of innocence until proven guilty is relevant to 
determining a fair balance of competing interests); Falter Zeitschriften GmbH v. 
Austria (dec.), App. No. 13540/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 8, 2007) (HUDOC 
Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-
en (acknowledging that even though politicians are subject to wider criticism than 
private individuals, they are still granted the same right to be innocent until proven 
guilty). 
 145. App. No. 17550/04 at ¶¶ 8-9. 
 146. Id. ¶ 63. 
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Convention rights of others.”147 However, the importance of the right 
to the presumption of innocence is tempered by other cases in which 
the Court has promoted a more careful analysis of the right in order 
to prevent abusive restrictions on the freedom of expression.148 
Furthermore, the Court has not included an explicit reference to 
Article 6(2) in every case involving an allegation of criminal 
conduct.149 Taken on the whole, the rationale behind the Court’s 
choice to sometimes incorporate the presumption of innocence into 
its reasoning and other times leave it unmentioned remains unclear.  
 4. The General Interest Criterion 
In its Article 10 defamation case law, post-Chauvy, the Court has 
made extensive use of the general interest criterion to strengthen the 
position of one or both rights involved in the conflict. 
The relevance of a general interest is evident in every Article 10 
case in which the role of the press is a pertinent factor. In such cases, 
the applicant’s freedom of expression is strengthened by the general 
interest a democratic society has in guaranteeing a free press and an 
open debate on matters of public interest.150 In this respect, the Court 
has consistently held that the public also has a right to receive such 
information.151 The Court has used this argument to limit the margin 
 
 147. Id. ¶ 71. 
 148. See A/S Diena v. Latvia, App. No. 16657/03, ¶ 86 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 12, 
2007) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search 
.asp?skin=hudoc-en (finding a violation of Article 10 despite the applicant’s use of 
terms with a heavy criminal connotation, such as “cheat” and “steal”). 
 149. For cases post-Chauvy in which the connection is not made, see Da Silva v. 
Portugal, App. No. 16983/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 19, 2010) (HUDOC Database), 
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en; Öztürk v. 
Turkey, App. No. 17095/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 9, 2009) (HUDOC Database), 
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en; 
Cumpănă v. Romania [GC], 2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 69. 
 150. See Radio France v. France, 2004-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 125, 149 (explaining 
that, although the press must stay within certain boundaries, it has a duty to 
disseminate information on matters of social concern). 
 151. E.g., Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 14, 26 (1986); Ivanova 
v. Bulgaria, App. No. 36207/03, ¶ 58 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 14, 2008) (HUDOC 
Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-
en. The public’s “right” to receive information falls under the general interest 
criterion because it involves a “right” that is assigned to the entire population in 
abstract terms and is thus more akin to a general interest than to a fundamental or 
human right. 
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of appreciation accorded to the national authorities and to apply strict 
scrutiny to restrictions on the freedom of expression exercised by the 
press.152 Similar protection has been accorded by the Court to other 
persons or entities that do not belong to the press, but nonetheless 
perform a similar function, including audiovisual media 
companies,153 NGOs,154 authors of books on issues of public 
interest,155 and specialists publishing in the press.156  
Another crucial factor in the defamation case law of the ECtHR 
that is closely linked to the general interest criterion is the 
existence—or in some cases absence—of a public interest in the 
allegedly defamatory statements. The Court links any public interest 
in hearing the statement to the public’s right to receive information 
 
 152. See, e.g., Lingens, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (weighing the 
requirements for the protection of privacy against the public interest in open 
discussion of political issues); Ivanova, App. No. 36207/03 at ¶58 (asserting that 
the press’s role as “public watchdog” is “vital” to society). 
 153. See, e.g., Radio Twist, A.S. v. Slovakia, App. No. 62202/00, ¶¶ 57-58 (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. Dec. 19, 2006) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr 
.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (advancing the argument that Article 10 
protections apply to the broadcast of telephone conversations as well to other kinds 
of commentary); Pedersen v. Denmark, App. No. 49017/99, ¶ 71 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Dec. 17, 2004) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/ 
tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (applying stringent Article 10 protections to 
television programs expressing political speech). 
 154. See, e.g., Vides Aizsardzības Klubs v. Latvia, App. No. 57829/00, ¶ 42 
(Eur. Ct. H.R. May 27, 2004) (HUDOC Database), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (highlighting the 
capacity for nongovernmental organizations to serve as “watchdogs” against 
disfunctional local authorities). 
 155. See, e.g., Azevedo v. Portugal, App. No. 20620/04, ¶ 31 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Mar. 27, 2008) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/ 
tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (implying that the public interest nature of the 
publication was a dispositive fact); Chauvy v. France, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 211, 
212 (applying the case law-created principles of Article 10 to a book on the French 
Resistance movement—a subject that holds substantial public interest). 
 156. See, e.g., Öztürk v. Turkey, App. No. 17095/03, ¶ 27 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 9, 
2009) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search 
.asp?skin=hudoc-en (noting that even though the applicant is not a journalist, the 
applicant was still fully protected under Article 10 because of his prominent role in 
the magazine article); Riolo v. Italy, App. No. 42211/07, ¶ 63 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 
17, 2008) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/ 
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (according expansive protections—the same as those 
usually granted to a journalist—to a political science researcher because he had 
published an article on a subject of public interest). 
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on matters of general interest.157 Where the statements are made in 
the context of a public debate, the Court provides additional 
protection by stating that there is limited scope for restriction of such 
speech.158 An examination of the defamation case law under Article 
10 shows that the Court has applied this principle liberally, finding 
the presence of a public interest very easily and, in some cases, 
upholding the public’s right to be informed even in the absence of a 
matter of general interest.159 This occurred in Karhuvaara v. Finland, 
a case where members of the press were convicted for tangentially 
mentioning the name of a politician in an article focused on a 
criminal proceeding against her husband.160 In this case, the Court 
established that the publication did not pertain to a matter of great 
 
 157. See, e.g., Romanenko v. Russia, App. No. 11751/03, ¶ 42 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Oct. 8, 2009) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/ 
tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (explaining that the matter was of public 
concern, and therefore, allegations about the official’s public life were protected 
under Article 10); Standard Verlags GmbH v. Austria, App. No. 19710/02, ¶ 56 
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 2, 2006) (HUDOC Database), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (holding that a 
politician’s protection of his reputation is outweighed by the public’s interest in 
obtaining information about his credibility). 
 158. E.g., Flux v. Moldova (no. 7), App. No. 25367/05, ¶ 39 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 
24, 2009) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/ 
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en; see, e.g., Krasulya v. Russia, App. No. 12365/03, ¶ 38 
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 22, 2007) (HUDOC Database), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (reiterating that the 
Court requires strong justifications for restricting political speech on issues of 
public interest because without them, general freedoms of expression would be 
endangered); Thoma v. Luxembourg, 2001-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 73, 87 (cautioning the 
Court to take care in validating restrictions on expression so as not to discourage 
the press from being involved in issues of interest to the public, especially those 
issues already being “widely debated”). 
 159. See, e.g., Azevedo, App. No. 20620/04 at ¶ 31 (considering the subject of 
the applicant’s publication as “rather specialized,” but still within the general 
interest); Tǿnsbergs Blad AS v. Norway, App. No. 510/04, ¶ 87 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Mar. 1, 2007) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe 
.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (finding that where a public figure may have 
failed to obey laws, even privately and outside of his official duties, the acts may 
be of public concern and thus protected under Article 10); Karhuvaara v. Finland, 
2004-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 263, 275 (stating that even though the matter may not be of 
great public concern, if it involves the lives of politicians and may influence 
voting, then it may still fall under the essential right in a democratic society to be 
informed). 
 160. 2004-X Eur. Ct. H.R. at 275. 
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public interest—at least with regard to the politician,161 but it 
nevertheless held that the public had a right to be informed about 
aspects of the private life of politicians.162 The Court connected the 
possible effect of the spouse’s potential conviction to citizen’s voting 
intentions, and thus found that some degree of public interest was 
involved.163 Finally, in several cases the Court has used the above 
principles to shift the balance in favor of the freedom of expression 
by finding that the domestic courts failed to consider the importance 
of free debate when striking a balance between the freedom of 
expression and the right to reputation.164  
In cases where there is an absence of public interest, but still a 
dissemination of information to the public, the Court has used this 
absence along with the impact criterion to decide in favor of the right 
to reputation.165 The Court has held that a distinction must be made 
between cases in which there exists a right of the public to be 
informed and those in which the publication merely serves to satisfy 
the curiosity of a certain readership.166 The Court applied this 
principle in Leempoel v. Belgium, finding that restrictions on the 
freedom of expression were justifiable when the publication in 
question directly criticized a judge’s character without offering any 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See, e.g., Romanenko v. Russia, App. No. 11751/03, ¶ 47 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Oct. 8, 2009) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/ 
tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (suggesting that regardless of whether they have 
a clear factual basis, statements made in the course of a “lively debate” should be 
made freely); Malisiewicz-Gasior v. Poland, App. No. 43797/98, ¶ 67 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. Apr. 6, 2006) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr 
.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (affirming the “crucial importance” of 
free debate and noting that politicians must be more tolerant of criticism). 
 165. See, e.g., Tammer v. Estonia, 2001-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 267, 281 (finding in 
favor of the applicant, a former public official, because the publication referred to 
aspects of her private life, and thus did not relate to any issue of public concern); 
De Revenga v. Spain (dec.) 2000-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 525, 531 (restricting 
publication of information regarding a love affair, which the Court found to be a 
“purely private” matter). 
 166. See, e.g., Standard Verlags GmbH v. Austria (no. 2), App. No. 21277/05, ¶ 
52 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 4, 2009) (HUDOC Database), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (distinguishing 
information about the health of politicians, which is a possible public concern, 
from gossip about the politician’s love life, a private matter). 
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contribution to a debate on a matter of general interest.167  
In other cases, the Court has established that certain statements 
amount to gratuitous personal attacks outside the scope of the 
freedom of expression.168 In Aguilera Jiménez v. Spain, for example, 
the court upheld the dismissal of union members who published a 
suggestive drawing of their company’s director and two employees 
accompanied by rude statements.169 Despite the fact that the 
applicants enjoyed additional protection of their freedom of 
expression as union members, the Court held that their rights had not 
been violated.170 The Court based its ruling on the offensive nature of 
the publication and its impact on the reputation of the two 
employees, finding that the personal attacks were not necessary for 
the defense of the union’s interests.171  
The Court has also used the general interest criterion to introduce 
conditions on the exercise of freedom of expression by applicants 
who are expected to protect a specific interest. Thus, lawyers are 
required to respect their special position as intermediaries between 
the courts and the public, which results in their responsibility to act 
in a “discrete, honest, and dignified” manner and to contribute to the 
proper administration of justice and the maintenance of confidence 
therein.172 Judges are likewise expected to honor a “duty of loyalty, 
 
 167. App. No. 64772/01, ¶ 77 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 9, 2006) (HUDOC Database), 
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en. 
 168. See, e.g., Aguilera Jiménez v. Spain, App. Nos. 28389/06, 28955/06, 
28957/06, 28959/06, 28961/06, & 28964/06, ¶¶ 30, 34 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 8, 2009) 
(HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp? 
skin=hudoc-en (implying that the Court should apply a lower threshold for 
proportionality and necessity in a democratic society when the speech at issue has 
no real societal value); Shabanov v. Russia, App. No. 5433/02, ¶¶ 11, 48 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. Dec. 14, 2006) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr 
.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (holding that the release of private 
medical information about a unit commander, who was also accused of being 
responsible for two hundred men falling ill, was an unnecessary attack rather than 
part of an issue of public concern). 
 169. App. No. 28389/06 at ¶ 6. 
 170. Id. ¶¶ 36-37. 
 171. Id. ¶¶ 30, 34. 
 172. Veraart v. The Netherlands, App. No. 10807/04, ¶ 51 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 
30, 2006) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/ 
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en; see Coutant v. France (dec.), App. No. 17155/03 (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. Jan 24, 2008) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp 
.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (referencing the “usual restrictions 
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reserve, and discretion” owed to their employer—the State.173 The 
special nature of the medical profession affects medical practitioners’ 
freedom of expression in the sense that they possess a high level of 
public confidence, which implies a need to preserve solidarity among 
members of the profession by supporting each other’s reputations.174 
Although the Court has yet to directly link these general interests to 
the right to reputation, this evolution would be prudent. The general 
interests involved in cases where the applicant relying on her 
freedom of expression is a lawyer, judge, or medical practitioner 
should strengthen the plaintiff’s right to reputation175 just as the 
general interests advanced by politicians and union members justly 
expand their freedom of expression. 
General interests protected by the plaintiff also have an impact in 
the Court’s case law. The Court has made a distinction between 
public officials who are engaged in law enforcement, such as 
prosecutors and judges, and all other public servants, such as 
appointed mayors. The Court gives the former group more protection 
against defamatory speech because of their roles as the guarantors of 
justice, finding that it may be necessary to protect them against 
unfounded destructive attacks in order to promote public confidence 
in the judiciary, while the latter group should tolerate more 
 
on conduct of members of the Bar” and the fact that lawyers hold “central 
position[s] in the administration of justice” as support for according lawyers 
diminished Article 10 protection). 
 173. See Kudeshkina v. Russia, App. No. 29492/05, ¶ 85 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 26, 
2009) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/ 
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (noting that all civil servants are held to a high standard 
since their positions require the utmost discretion). 
 174. See Frankowicz v. Poland, App. No. 53025/99, ¶ 49 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 16, 
2008) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search 
.asp?skin=hudoc-en (analogizing to lawyers, who have duties to their clients just as 
doctors have duties to their patients, as part of the Court’s eventual holding that 
sanctioning a doctor for giving a disparaging assessment of his patient’s previous 
health care violated Article 10). 
 175. One might also argue that the involvement of a general interest should 
limit the freedom of expression of the applicant. However, the wording used in the 
above text is preferable, for reasons of principle and clarity. Allowing general 
interests to bolster the right to reputation means that an applicant’s freedom of 
expression is not diminished in importance. Furthermore, general interests here 
play their role in the most logical way—by strengthening the reputation of those 
protected by such interests. 
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demanding public scrutiny.176 On the other hand, the Court has also 
warned of the possibility of public servants abusing the right to sue 
for defamation and the negative impact this could have on free and 
open debate on matters of public interest.177 For instance, in Dyuldin 
v. Russia, a defamation action had been lodged by dozens of 
members of a regional government after the applicants had accused 
the regional authority of misuse of funds and reprisals against the 
independent media.178 Here, in finding for the applicants, the Court 
relied on the legal requirement that the impugned statement refer to a 
particular person before it can form the basis of a claim for 
defamation.179 Allowing one or more state officials to sue for 
defamation whenever criticism is levied against the government 
would have an inevitable “chilling effect” on the press in performing 
its task as “public watchdog.”180  
 5. The Purpose Criterion 
The research performed in preparation for this article did not 
reveal any direct applications of the purpose criterion in the Court’s 
Article 10 defamation case law. However, the limit placed on 
freedom of expression by the Court in cases involving gratuitous 
personal attacks could be interpreted as relating to the purpose 
criterion. When members of the press use their powers to publish 
articles that have no bearing on a debate of public interest, but only 
serve to attack a named individual on a personal level, it could be 
 
 176. See Prager v. Austria, 313 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 17-18 (1995) (noting that 
members of the judiciary, including law enforcement, are afforded a higher level of 
protection from public scrutiny than politicians because law enforcement officers 
depend on public confidence to successfully serve the public). But see Zakharov v. 
Russia, App. No. 14881/03, ¶ 25 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 5, 2006) (HUDOC Database), 
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en 
(remarking that a prosecutor’s ability to handle abusive criticism contributes to the 
authority of the judiciary). 
 177. Öztürk v. Turkey, App. No. 17095/03, ¶ 32 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 9, 2009) 
(HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp? 
skin=hudoc-en; see Dyuldin v. Russia, App. No. 25968/02, ¶ 43 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
July 31, 2007) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/ 
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (expressing concern that the press could be involved in 
an endless series of litigation if public officials were able to sue them over every 
negative portrayal). 
 178. Dyuldin, App. No. 25968/02 at ¶¶ 10, 12. 
 179. Id. ¶ 43. 
 180. Id. 
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argued that they exercise their freedom of expression in a manner not 
consistent with their role in a democratic society—to inform the 
public on matters of general interest. 
 6. The Responsibility Criterion 
The ECtHR’s legal reasoning in defamation cases has undergone a 
noticeable evolution, post-Chauvy, with regard to the duties and 
responsibilities referred to in Article 10(2).181 Throughout its case 
law, the Court has specified that these duties and responsibilities 
require journalists to act in good faith and to provide accurate and 
reliable information in accordance with the ethics of journalism.182 
Although generally limited to cases involving publications in the 
press, the Court has also evaluated the good faith of applicants who 
made allegedly defamatory remarks elsewhere.183  
In its pre-Chauvy case law, the Court referred only sporadically to 
the duties and responsibilities of Article 10(2), finding that they are 
liable to take on significance in cases that involve attacking the 
reputation of a named individual.184 However, after recognizing 
reputation as an element of private life protected under Article 8, the 
 
 181. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2, art. 10(2) (“The 
exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may 
be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed 
by law and are necessary . . . .”). 
 182. See, e.g., Pedersen v. Denmark, App. No. 49017/99, ¶ 78 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Dec. 17, 2004) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/ 
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (noting that journalists are under an ethical obligation to 
provide “reliable and precise” information, especially when a person’s reputation 
is being attacked); Bladet Tromsǿ v. Norway [GC], 1999-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 295, 
324-25 (discussing the media’s “duties and responsibilities” to verify information 
that it publishes, particularly if it is defamatory); cf. Fressoz v. France [GC], 1999-
I Eur. Ct. H.R. 5, 23-24 (cautioning that even though Article 10 provides 
significant protection to journalists, it does not, in principle, allow them to 
circumvent criminal laws). 
 183. See, e.g., Juppala v. Finland, App. No. 18620/03, ¶¶ 42-43 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Dec. 2, 2008) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/ 
tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (asserting that a person who tries to protect a 
child from abuse should not be concerned with violating defamation laws when he 
shares the information he has obtained). 
 184. McVicar v. The United Kingdom, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 261, 280; Bladet 
Tromsǿ, 1999-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 324-25; see Fressoz, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 21-
22 (indicating that the “duties and responsibilities” of journalists depend on the 
situation but that information disclosed about a private individual must always 
relate to a matter of public concern). 
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Court has relied on these duties and responsibilities in a more 
systematic manner.185 In applying the requirement of good faith to 
concrete cases, the Court has linked it to the standards of proof 
required for statements of fact and/or value judgments.186 The Court 
has thus in several post-Chauvy cases found a failure to exhibit good 
faith when an applicant either had not attempted to verify the 
reliability of her sources or was not able to substantiate her 
defamatory statements by providing proof or at least a sufficient 
factual basis.187 This was the deciding factor in Europapress Holding 
D.O.O. v. Croatia, in which the applicant could not substantiate her 
factual accusation, made in a newspaper article, that a certain 
Minister had threatened to kill a journalist while pointing a gun at 
her.188 Here, the Court settled the conflict between freedom of 
expression and the right to reputation in favor of the latter because 
the applicant had not upheld her duties and responsibilities in 
 
 185. See, e.g., Pedersen, App. No. 49017/99 at ¶ 78 (surmising that special 
grounds are required before the media can be relieved of their ordinary obligation 
to verify factual statements that defame private individuals); Busuioc v. Moldova, 
App. No. 61513/00, ¶ 59 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 21, 2004) (HUDOC Database), 
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (obliging 
journalists to act in good faith to provide accurate and reliable information in 
accordance with the ethics of journalism). 
 186. See, e.g., Kwiecień v. Poland, App. No. 51744/99, ¶ 54 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 
9, 2007) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/ 
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (finding that, though the lower court found that none of 
the statements had a sufficient factual basis, the applicant was nonetheless acting 
in good faith and participating in a public debate); Radio Twist, A.S. v. Slovakia, 
App. No. 62202/00, ¶ 63 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 19, 2006) (HUDOC Database), 
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (basing 
the Court’s judgment in part on the fact that the journalists were not acting in bad 
faith in their report). 
 187. See, e.g., Europapress Holding D.O.O. v. Croatia, App. No. 25333/06, ¶¶ 
66-68 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 22, 2009) (HUDOC Database), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (reiterating that “the 
more serious the allegation is, the more solid the factual basis should be”); 
Mahmudov v. Azerbaijan, App. No. 35877/04, ¶ 44 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 18, 2008) 
(HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp? 
skin=hudoc-en (demonstrating that it was not sufficient for the applicant to claim 
that his assertions were “generally known fact[s] which did not require proof”); 
Alithia Publ’g Co. v. Cyprus, App. No. 17550/03, ¶ 67 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 22, 
2008) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/ 
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (finding that, since the applicants did not practice good 
faith, there was no reason to determine whether any special circumstances 
ultimately existed to excuse them from verifying the statements). 
 188. App. No. 25333/06 at ¶¶ 6, 67. 
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exercising her freedom of expression.189 However, the Court has also 
developed a line of reasoning whereby it considers whether special 
grounds exist for discharging the press media’s ordinary obligations 
to verify factual statements that defame private individuals.190 The 
existence of such special grounds depends on the “nature and degree 
of defamation at hand” and the reliability of the sources providing 
the information.191 These elements are linked, respectively, to the 
impact and the responsibility criteria of the model.  
In a limited number of cases, the Court has relied on this line of 
“special grounds” reasoning to find that the applicant had acted in 
good faith despite the absence of sufficient evidence for a statement 
of fact or value judgment on an issue of public interest.192 For 
example, in Flux v. Moldova (no. 7), the Court established that the 
applicant had acted in good faith, despite there being insufficient 
evidence to support the allegation, published in a news article, that 
members of the Communist Party had been granted free housing in a 
 
 189. Id. ¶¶ 66-71. Compare Flux v. Moldova (no. 1), App. No. 28702/03, ¶¶ 29, 
31 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 20, 2007) (HUDOC Database), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (finding no Article 10 
violation even though the journalists were unable to prove the truth of their 
statements), with Alithia Publ’g Co., App. No. 17550/04 at ¶ 71 (determining that 
interference with Article 10 rights was justified because applicants lacked good 
faith and acted in “flagrant disregard of the duties of responsible journalism”). 
 190. See Pedersen, App. No. 49017/99 at ¶ 78 (noting that this exception will 
apply only in a narrow set of circumstances); Bladet Tromsǿ v. Norway [GC], 
1999-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 295, 325 (specifying that the presence of such grounds 
should be determined “in light of the situation as it presented itself to [the 
applicant] at the material time, rather than with the benefit of hindsight”). 
 191. Bladet Tromsǿ, 1999-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 325; see Flux (no. 1), App. No. 
28702/03 at ¶¶ 28-32 (providing an example of post-Chauvy cases in which an 
additional element is added—the manner in which the article in question is 
written). 
 192. See, e.g., Flux v. Moldova (no. 7), App. No. 25367/05, ¶¶ 41-44 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. Nov. 24, 2009) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/ 
tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (holding that the applicant acted in good faith by 
visiting apartments in question to verify information, and that it would be 
unreasonable to ask for a more complete investigation given the lack of official 
information about the issue); Tǿnsbergs Blad AS v. Norway, App. No. 510/04, ¶¶ 
96, 101 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 1, 2007) (HUDOC Database), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (finding that the 
applicant acted in good faith, even though he did not verify his sources, because he 
had worked on the issue for an extensive period of time and possessed official 
documents regarding the issue). 
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State-owned warehouse building.193 The Court came to this 
conclusion after finding that certain underlying facts were 
undisputed, thus granting a level of credibility to the allegation, and 
that the applicant had conducted adequate research in an attempt to 
verify the information and had acted in a professional manner by 
stating in the publication that it had not been possible to verify the 
truth of the allegation.194  
As a result of the above ambiguity and other factors, such as the 
absence of a systematic reference to duties and responsibilities in 
post-Chauvy cases and the uncertainty of its impact on the reasoning 
of the Court, the exact weight of the responsibility criterion in the 
post-Chauvy case law remains unclear. However, the Court’s 
increased number of references to the duties and responsibilities 
inherent in the exercise of freedom of expression indicates a certain 
sensitivity for this criterion. The Court would benefit from further 
exploring the possibility of its systematic application. 
An interesting indication of the potential value of the 
responsibility criterion can be found in Times Newspapers Ltd v. The 
United Kingdom (nos. 1 and 2).195 In this case, which involved the 
archiving of defamatory publications, the Court held that the press 
has a strict obligation to act within the principles of responsible 
journalism when maintaining news archives.196 The Court supported 
this finding by noting that there is limited urgency to publish such 
archives.197 However, the Court agreed with the applicants that 
defamation victims should move quickly to protect their reputations, 
otherwise certain rights of the press would be infringed.198 The Court 
accordingly encouraged the imposition of statutes of limitation for 
defamation claims, and suggested that the length of the limitation 
period should be determined by striking a balance between the need 
 
 193. Flux (no. 7), App. No. 25367/05 at ¶¶ 7, 45. 
 194. Id. ¶ 44. 
 195. App. Nos. 3002/03 & 23676/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 10, 2009) (HUDOC 
Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-
en. 
 196. Id. ¶ 45. 
 197. Id. 
 198. See id. ¶ 46 (explaining that a time limitation is necessary to guarantee that 
newspapers are able to adequately defend themselves, since a lengthy delay could 
result in the loss of information). 
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to protect the freedom of expression and the right to reputation.199 
Here the Court combined the responsibility criterion and the 
additional rights criterion to advocate for a middle ground, or in 
other words, a practical concordance between both rights. 
B. THE LEGAL REASONING OF THE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 8 OF 
THE ECHR 
Article 8 defamation cases come before the the ECtHR when a 
plaintiff, whose domestic defamation proceeding has failed, claims a 
violation of her right to reputation.200 The Court addressed this 
conflict in cases such as Karakó v. Hungary and Gunnarsson v. 
Iceland, analyzed above.201 
An examination of several other Article 8 cases shows that the 
legal reasoning of the Court in those cases is in some respects more 
systematic than that employed in its Article 10 case law. First, the 
Court begins its Article 8 analysis by explicitly identifying the 
conflict between freedom of expression and the right to reputation, 
thus paving the way for attention to be paid to both rights.202 Second, 
the Court appears to take a more balanced approach to the conflict in 
Article 8 cases. While it has also relied heavily on the principles 
developed under its Article 10 case law, it has been more aware of 
the need to examine the case from the perspective of both rights 
involved.203 The Court has thus established that the positive 
 
 199. Id. ¶¶ 46, 48. 
 200. E.g., Karakó v. Hungary, App. No. 39311/05, ¶ 18 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 28, 
2009) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/ 
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en. 
 201. See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text. 
 202. E.g., A. v. Norway, App. No. 28070/06, ¶ 65 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 9, 2009) 
(HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp? 
skin=hudoc-en; Petrina v. Romania, App. No. 78060/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 14, 
2008) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/ 
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en; Pfeifer v. Austria, App. No. 12556/03, ¶ 38 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. Nov. 15, 2007) (HUDOC Database), available at http://cmiskp 
.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en; White v. Sweden, App. No. 
42435/02, ¶¶ 20-21 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 19, 2006) (HUDOC Database), available 
at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en; see Minelli v. 
Switzerland (dec.), App. No. 14991/02, ¶ 21 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 14, 2005) 
(HUDOC Database) available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp? 
skin=hudoc-en (referring continuously to the “personality” of the applicant, but not 
to their “reputation”). 
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obligations of Article 8 may arise where defamatory statements 
exceed the limits of acceptable criticism allowed under Article 10.204 
Third, in certain Article 8 cases, the Court offers additional insight 
into its view on the relationship between freedom of expression and 
the right to reputation, thereby offering more transparency in its 
reasoning. In Petrina v. Romania, for example, the Court ruled that 
statements directly accusing a named individual and completely 
devoid of a factual basis cannot benefit from the defense of 
exaggeration or provocation.205 
Regarding the presumption of innocence in cases involving 
allegations of criminal conduct, the Court’s Article 8 case law offers 
mixed results, similar to its Article 10 case law. While the Court did 
not reference Article 6(2) in Pfeifer v. Austria,206 it did consider the 
right to presumption of innocence in White v. Sweden.207 The latter 
case arose after newspaper articles ascribed several criminal offenses 
to the applicant, including the murder of Prime Minister Olaf 
Palme.208 The Court ultimately found no violation of Article 8 on 
these facts, deciding instead that the public interest in being informed 
outweighed the applicant’s right to reputation.209  
While the Court’s reasoning under Article 8 is, in some ways, 
more coherent and transparent than its reasoning under Article 10, 
the Court still falls prey to some of the same pitfalls in both sets of 
case law. Most notably, it continues the one-sided application of the 
impact criterion and fails to remedy the problematic issue of 
preferential framing. An example of the former can be found in A. v. 
Norway, a case in which a newspaper article alleged that, due to his 
prior conviction, the applicant was the prime suspect in a murder 
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investigation.210 In this case, the Court found a violation of Article 8 
after establishing that the public interest nature of the publication did 
not justify the defamatory allegations, considering that the 
publication represented a “particularly grievous prejudice to the 
applicant’s honour and reputation that was especially harmful to his 
moral and psychological integrity and to his private life.”211 
Regrettably, the Court here exhibits one of the major shortcomings 
of the case law under Article 10; namely, it applies the impact 
criterion only from the side of the invoked right—the right to 
reputation—without examining the impact on the other right—the 
freedom of expression. This one-sided application is a substantial 
indication that the Court continues to practice preferential framing in 
its defamation case law.  
Arguably, the most striking difference between the Article 8 and 
Article 10 case law is the distinction between statements of fact and 
value judgments. In two Article 8 cases, the Court found a violation 
largely based on the lack of proof for the factual allegations.212 
However, in both cases the Court also stated that even if it had 
considered the statement to be a value judgment, the ruling would 
have been the same because there was no sufficient factual basis to 
support the claim.213  
In Pfeifer v. Austria, a case involving articles in a weekly 
publication, there was an allegation that a journalist’s harsh criticism 
of a professor had unleashed a witch hunt against him, which 
eventually caused his suicide.214 Here, the Court held that the 
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domestic court’s failure to provide relief to the applicant violated his 
right to reputation under Article 8.215 The accusation that the 
journalist was morally responsible for the professor’s death severely 
maligned his reputation and lacked a sufficient factual basis.216 
Therefore, the defendant’s freedom of expression did not outweigh 
the applicant’s right to reputation.217 In light of the Court’s tendency, 
in an Article 10 analysis, to determine the status of the statement 
independently and to take a lenient attitude toward the requirement 
of a factual basis, it can seriously be doubted whether the result 
would have been the same if the case had been brought under Article 
10. This further indicates that a problem of preferential framing 
indeed exists in the Court’s defamation case law.218 
CONCLUSION 
The European Court of Human Rights recognized the existence of 
a conflict between the right to freedom of expression and the right to 
reputation in defamation cases in Chauvy v. France.219 Yet, the effect 
of this recognition on the legal reasoning of the Court under Article 
10 has been minimal. While the legal reasoning of the Court under 
Article 8 appears, to a certain extent, to be more systematic, there 
remains a lack of consistency and transparency in the Court’s 
reasoning under both Articles. The main problem is preferential 
framing, primarily caused by what can be referred to as the one-sided 
application of the impact criterion.  
There are strong indications that the Court’s ruling in a given case 
indeed depends on which Article is invoked by the applicant. 
However, the research has also discerned interesting lines of 
reasoning in the Court’s case law, which are closely connected to the 
elements of the model presented in this paper. A more widespread 
adherence to these lines of reasoning and to the model would assist 
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the Court in developing a more consistent and transparent resolution 
to the conflict between freedom of expression and the right to 
reputation.  
Considered on the whole, the Court’s defamation case law clearly 
supports a Praktische Konkordanz solution to the conflict between 
freedom of expression and the right to reputation—where neither 
right is granted absolute preference. The Court advocates finding a 
middle ground between both rights because the freedom of 
expression does not confer an unlimited right to make statements that 
affect another’s reputation, and because the right to reputation does 
not warrant a complete protection against all critical statements. In 
this respect, an important conclusion to be drawn from the research is 
that the criteria of the model, while designed to determine which 
right should take preference in the event of a conflict, can also assist 
in finding a practical concordance between the freedom of 
expression and the right to reputation in abstracto. 
